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The​ ​aim​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​is​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​a​ ​link​ ​between​ ​past​ ​interventions​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​by​ ​various 
branches​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​military​ ​into​ ​Central​ ​America​ ​and​ ​the​ ​unfavorable​ ​conditions​ ​in 
which​ ​millions​ ​of​ ​people​ ​find​ ​themselves​ ​living​ ​in​ ​today.​ ​Ironically,​ ​while​ ​American​ ​values​ ​such 
as​ ​self​ ​determination​ ​and​ ​democracy​ ​are​ ​preached​ ​by​ ​the​ ​international​ ​elite,​ ​financial​ ​interests 
have​ ​systematically​ ​stood​ ​in​ ​the​ ​way​ ​of​ ​these​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​societies 
throughout​ ​most​ ​of​ ​their​ ​shared​ ​history.​ ​Following​ ​a​ ​brief​ ​introduction​ ​laying​ ​out​ ​key​ ​turning 
points​ ​in​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​the​ ​relationships​ ​which​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​has​ ​enjoyed​ ​with​ ​Latin 
American​ ​countries,​ ​I​ ​go​ ​on​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​the​ ​historical​ ​background​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​Revolution 
and​ ​the​ ​subsequent​ ​Contra​ ​War.​ ​The​ ​next​ ​section​ ​emphasizes​ ​the​ ​contemporary​ ​situation​ ​in 
Honduras​ ​following​ ​the​ ​2009​ ​coup​ ​d’etat​ ​of​ ​democratically​ ​elected​ ​President​ ​José​ ​Manuel 
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In​ ​international​ ​relations,​ ​the​ ​behaviors​ ​of​ ​state​ ​actors​ ​are​ ​most​ ​commonly​ ​determined 
by​ ​preexisting​ ​norms​ ​and​ ​precedents.​ ​Leaders​ ​of​ ​wealthy​ ​and​ ​impoverished​ ​nations​ ​alike​ ​inherit 
relationships​ ​with​ ​other​ ​countries​ ​from​ ​their​ ​predecessors,​ ​and​ ​world​ ​leaders​ ​typically​ ​work​ ​to 
ensure​ ​stability​ ​through​ ​the​ ​maintenance​ ​of​ ​these​ ​relationships.​ ​Acting​ ​in​ ​a​ ​nation’s​ ​best​ ​interest 
by​ ​developing​ ​alliances​ ​often​ ​ensures​ ​stability​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​and​ ​interactions​ ​with​ ​other​ ​world 
leaders​ ​give​ ​heads​ ​of​ ​state​ ​legitimacy.​ ​This​ ​trend​ ​is​ ​central​ ​to​ ​the​ ​processes​ ​that​ ​have​ ​defined 
the​ ​world​ ​since​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​World​ ​War​ ​II,​ ​which​ ​marked​ ​the​ ​beginning​ ​of​ ​the​ ​West’s​ ​commitment 
to​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​growth.​ ​In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​complete​ ​this​ ​newfound​ ​vision,​ ​the​ ​wealthy​ ​and 
powerful​ ​nations​ ​of​ ​Europe​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​developed​ ​structures​ ​which​ ​would 
foster​ ​interdependence​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​disincentivize​ ​international​ ​conflict​ ​between​ ​each​ ​other.​ ​In 
regards​ ​to​ ​the​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“third​ ​world”​ ​which​ ​was​ ​rapidly​ ​being​ ​constructed​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time, 
powerful​ ​leaders​ ​attempted​ ​to​ ​solidify​ ​pre-existing​ ​lucrative​ ​relationships​ ​with​ ​economically 
weaker​ ​nations​ ​as​ ​a​ ​means​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​power​ ​struggles​ ​and​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​those​ ​regions.​ ​While​ ​this 
process​ ​had​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​fostering​ ​trade​ ​between​ ​the​ ​wealthy​ ​and​ ​poor​ ​nations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​it 
commonly​ ​legitimized​ ​oppressive​ ​leaders​ ​who​ ​seized​ ​what​ ​little​ ​wealth​ ​existed​ ​in​ ​their​ ​country​ ​in 
order​ ​to​ ​come​ ​to​ ​power.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​vast​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​such​ ​cases,​ ​the​ ​powerful​ ​economic​ ​elites​ ​of​ ​poor 
nations​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​impede​ ​economic​ ​progress​ ​in​ ​their​ ​societies​ ​by​ ​restructuring​ ​the​ ​flow​ ​of 
wealth​ ​created​ ​by​ ​international​ ​commerce​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​benefit​ ​themselves​ ​and​ ​their​ ​families.​ ​This 
trend​ ​has​ ​produced​ ​unintended​ ​social​ ​consequences​ ​through​ ​widespread​ ​suffering​ ​while 
entrenching​ ​inequality​ ​worldwide.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“third​ ​world”​ ​has​ ​historically​ ​come​ ​to 
embrace​ ​the​ ​attractive​ ​profile​ ​of​ ​Marxism​ ​through​ ​enormous​ ​social​ ​movements,​ ​a​ ​phenomenon 
that​ ​has​ ​unequivocally​ ​generated​ ​fierce​ ​backlash​ ​and​ ​opposition​ ​from​ ​both​ ​regional​ ​elites​ ​and 
the​ ​international​ ​community​ ​alike.  
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Following​ ​the​ ​American​ ​War​ ​of​ ​Independence​ ​from​ ​Great​ ​Britain,​ ​the​ ​fledgling​ ​nation 
was​ ​tasked​ ​with​ ​creating​ ​a​ ​sustainable​ ​national​ ​structure​ ​which​ ​would​ ​prove​ ​to​ ​be​ ​both 
economically​ ​prosperous​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​immune​ ​from​ ​foreign​ ​aggressions.​ ​After​ ​an​ ​unsuccessful 
attempt​ ​to​ ​re-establish​ ​colonial​ ​dominance​ ​over​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​by​ ​Great​ ​Britain​ ​during​ ​the 
War​ ​of​ ​1812,​ ​fostering​ ​regional​ ​stability​ ​became​ ​tantamount​ ​to​ ​national​ ​security.​ ​In​ ​1823,​ ​the 
administration​ ​of​ ​president​ ​James​ ​Monroe​ ​published​ ​the​ ​Monroe​ ​Doctrine​ ​with​ ​the​ ​intention​ ​of 
limiting​ ​European​ ​influence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​western​ ​hemisphere​ ​while​ ​providing​ ​the​ ​emerging 
independent​ ​republics​ ​of​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​with​ ​the​ ​freedom​ ​of​ ​national​ ​self-determination.​ ​As​ ​a 
result​ ​of​ ​protecting​ ​the​ ​western​ ​hemisphere​ ​from​ ​European​ ​exploits,​ ​American​ ​entrepreneurs 
were​ ​able​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​lucrative​ ​businesses​ ​throughout​ ​much​ ​of​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​with​ ​little 
competition.​ ​By​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​19th​ ​century,​ ​however,​ ​much​ ​of​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​was​ ​struggling 
through​ ​a​ ​slew​ ​of​ ​brutal​ ​dictators​ ​following​ ​the​ ​violent​ ​and​ ​drawn​ ​out​ ​processes​ ​of​ ​nation 
building,​ ​as​ ​is​ ​evidenced​ ​by​ ​the​ ​brief​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​Federation​ ​and​ ​the 
brutal​ ​regimes​ ​which​ ​succeeded​ ​it.  
In​ ​1898,​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​defeated​ ​the​ ​Spanish​ ​Empire​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Spanish-American​ ​War, 
and​ ​Spain​ ​lost​ ​control​ ​over​ ​its​ ​few​ ​remaining​ ​colonies​ ​of​ ​Puerto​ ​Rico,​ ​Cuba,​ ​Guam,​ ​and​ ​the 
Philippines.​ ​This​ ​event​ ​is​ ​commonly​ ​interpreted​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​catalyst​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States 
as​ ​an​ ​international​ ​actor​ ​on​ ​the​ ​world​ ​stage,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​essentially​ ​replaced​ ​Spain​ ​in 
its​ ​role​ ​as​ ​an​ ​economic​ ​magnet​ ​for​ ​the​ ​industry​ ​of​ ​these​ ​islands.​ ​Recognizing​ ​the​ ​country’s 
newfound​ ​influence,​ ​President​ ​Theodore​ ​Roosevelt​ ​added​ ​the​ ​Roosevelt​ ​Corollary​ ​to​ ​the 
Monroe​ ​Doctrine​ ​in​ ​1904,​ ​justifying​ ​intervention​ ​in​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​in​ ​“flagrant​ ​instances​ ​of 
wrongdoing​ ​or​ ​impotence”.​ ​True​ ​to​ ​the​ ​corollary,​ ​countless​ ​interventions​ ​by​ ​various​ ​branches​ ​of 
the​ ​US​ ​military​ ​throughout​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​occurred​ ​in​ ​the​ ​subsequent​ ​decades,​ ​however 
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wrongdoing​ ​and​ ​impotence​ ​were​ ​loosely​ ​interpreted​ ​to​ ​prompt​ ​military​ ​interventions​ ​which 
protected​ ​the​ ​financial​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​multinational​ ​corporations​ ​and​ ​wealthy​ ​landowners.  
During​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​of​ ​William​ ​Howard​ ​Taft,​ ​Roosevelt’s​ ​successor,​ ​“Dollar 
Diplomacy”​ ​was​ ​officially​ ​adopted​ ​as​ ​a​ ​mechanism​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​policy.​ ​This​ ​established​ ​the 
practice​ ​of​ ​granting​ ​loans​ ​to​ ​fledgling​ ​nations​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​expand​ ​American​ ​business​ ​presence 
into​ ​those​ ​nations.​ ​Foreign​ ​leaders​ ​would​ ​enthusiastically​ ​accept​ ​desperately​ ​needed​ ​money, 
while​ ​becoming​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​foreign​ ​investors​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​grow​ ​their​ ​economies​ ​to​ ​the​ ​point 
where​ ​these​ ​loans​ ​could​ ​be​ ​repaid.​ ​This​ ​practice​ ​legitimized​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​regimes​ ​by 
including​ ​them​ ​in​ ​the​ ​processes​ ​of​ ​international​ ​finance,​ ​while​ ​also​ ​pegging​ ​the​ ​interests​ ​of 
dictators​ ​to​ ​those​ ​of​ ​American​ ​business​ ​leaders.  
The​ ​subsequent​ ​decades​ ​were​ ​marked​ ​by​ ​increased​ ​production​ ​due​ ​to​ ​American​ ​needs 
during​ ​the​ ​world​ ​wars​ ​and​ ​further​ ​entrenchment​ ​of​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​elites.​ ​When​ ​global 
dominance​ ​was​ ​divided​ ​between​ ​the​ ​opposing​ ​economic​ ​ideologies​ ​of​ ​Capitalism​ ​and 
Communism​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Cold​ ​War,​ ​many​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​societies​ ​rejected​ ​the​ ​status​ ​quo​ ​which 
had​ ​come​ ​to​ ​strengthen​ ​oppression​ ​and​ ​inequality.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​an​ ​interventionist​ ​attitude​ ​was 
revitalized​ ​within​ ​the​ ​American​ ​government,​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​the​ ​apparent​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​obligation​ ​that 
many​ ​presidents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​have​ ​shown​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to​ ​the​ ​monitoring​ ​of​ ​the​ ​social​ ​and 
economic​ ​dealings​ ​of​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​(Loveman). 
The​ ​three​ ​examples​ ​mentioned​ ​above​ ​reveal​ ​a​ ​connection​ ​between​ ​past​ ​and​ ​present 
economic​ ​initiatives​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​by​ ​the​ ​US​ ​government​ ​and​ ​emphasize​ ​a​ ​continuation​ ​of 
international​ ​precedents.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​they​ ​show​ ​how​ ​commercial​ ​relationships​ ​have​ ​worked​ ​to 
entrench​ ​social​ ​inequalities​ ​which​ ​exist​ ​in​ ​Latin​ ​America,​ ​and​ ​offer​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​into​ ​the 






Nicaragua:​ ​A​ ​People​ ​Divided 
 
 
2.1-​ ​History​ ​of​ ​Intervention​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua 
 
Like​ ​many​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​states,​ ​self​ ​determination​ ​has​ ​been​ ​a​ ​foreign​ ​concept​ ​for 
much​ ​of​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​history,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​stage​ ​for​ ​conflict​ ​and​ ​intervention​ ​in​ ​the​ ​small​ ​country​ ​was 
set​ ​even​ ​during​ ​colonial​ ​times.​ ​While​ ​Europe​ ​was​ ​undergoing​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​period, 
Lockean​ ​ideas​ ​spread​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Spanish​ ​colony​ ​around​ ​the​ ​turn​ ​of​ ​the​ ​18th​ ​century​ ​(Booth,​ ​11). 
While​ ​some​ ​had​ ​much​ ​to​ ​gain​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​enthusiastically​ ​embraced​ ​economic​ ​liberalism, 
others​ ​saw​ ​their​ ​wealth​ ​and​ ​influence​ ​threatened.​ ​A​ ​rift​ ​between​ ​liberal​ ​and​ ​conservative 
members​ ​of​ ​Central-American​ ​society​ ​was​ ​thus​ ​created​ ​which​ ​was​ ​consistently​ ​reproduced 
throughout​ ​the​ ​subsequent​ ​generations​ ​of​ ​war​ ​and​ ​depression.  
It​ ​was​ ​at​ ​this​ ​point​ ​in​ ​history​ ​that​ ​a​ ​power-hungry​ ​creole​ ​(of​ ​European​ ​descent)​ ​elite​ ​was 
divided​ ​into​ ​new-money​ ​liberals​ ​and​ ​old-money​ ​conservatives,​ ​drastically​ ​destabilizing​ ​the​ ​upper 
class.​ ​When​ ​Central​ ​America​ ​became​ ​independent​ ​from​ ​Mexico​ ​in​ ​1823​ ​following​ ​Mexico’s 
independence​ ​from​ ​Spain​ ​two​ ​years​ ​earlier,​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​isthmus​ ​slipped​ ​into​ ​a​ ​bloody​ ​civil​ ​war. 
Conservative​ ​forces​ ​were​ ​able​ ​to​ ​gain​ ​a​ ​strong​ ​enough​ ​advantage​ ​that​ ​in​ ​1838,​ ​Nicaragua 
became​ ​independent​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​Federation​ ​and​ ​was​ ​immediately​ ​engulfed​ ​in​ ​an 
economic​ ​depression​ ​(13).​ ​Seeing​ ​such​ ​economic​ ​plight​ ​as​ ​an​ ​opportunity​ ​to​ ​gain​ ​power​ ​and 
influence,​ ​wealthy​ ​American​ ​mercenary​ ​William​ ​Walker​ ​began​ ​organizing​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​liberal 
factions​ ​in​ ​exchange​ ​for​ ​land.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​the​ ​British​ ​Navy​ ​and​ ​other​ ​Central​ ​American 
countries​ ​organized​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​conservative​ ​factions,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​National​ ​War 
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broke​ ​out​ ​in​ ​1855.​ ​5​ ​years​ ​later,​ ​Walker​ ​and​ ​the​ ​liberals​ ​were​ ​defeated,​ ​ushering​ ​in​ ​30​ ​years​ ​of 
stability​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​growth​ ​(19).  
From​ ​1860​ ​up​ ​until​ ​the​ ​1890s,​ ​economic​ ​growth​ ​was​ ​marked​ ​by​ ​the​ ​seizure​ ​and 
privatization​ ​of​ ​indigenous-,​ ​church-,​ ​and​ ​subsistence​ ​farmer-​ ​owned​ ​land,​ ​which​ ​was​ ​converted 
into​ ​plantations​ ​for​ ​coffee,​ ​an​ ​emerging​ ​cash​ ​crop​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time.​ ​Financed​ ​by​ ​British​ ​and​ ​German 
investors,​ ​a​ ​new​ ​class​ ​of​ ​​cafetaleros​ ​​emerged​ ​and​ ​began​ ​to​ ​occupy​ ​the​ ​upper​ ​echelons​ ​of 
Nicaraguan​ ​society.​ ​While​ ​differences​ ​between​ ​liberal​ ​and​ ​conservative​ ​ideology​ ​continued​ ​to 
exist,​ ​elite​ ​members​ ​of​ ​both​ ​camps​ ​saw​ ​their​ ​wealth​ ​increase​ ​drastically​ ​as​ ​land​ ​was​ ​converted 
into​ ​coffee​ ​plantations​ ​under​ ​capitalist​ ​liberal​ ​reforms.​ ​When​ ​liberal​ ​president​ ​José​ ​Santos 
Zelaya​ ​assumed​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​in​ ​1893,​ ​he​ ​ambitiously​ ​assumed​ ​that​ ​he​ ​could​ ​further​ ​attract 
conservative​ ​interests​ ​by​ ​exaggerating​ ​liberal​ ​economic​ ​reforms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​past​ ​30​ ​years​ ​(24). 
Another​ ​key​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​administration​ ​was​ ​nationalism,​ ​which​ ​engendered 
anti-interventionism.​ ​His​ ​presidency​ ​thus​ ​alienated​ ​both​ ​domestic​ ​conservative​ ​factions​ ​as​ ​well 
as​ ​American​ ​and​ ​British​ ​interests,​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​a​ ​U.S.-British​ ​sponsored​ ​conservative​ ​uprising​ ​in 
1909.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​public​ ​self​ ​perception​ ​following​ ​the​ ​Spanish-American​ ​War​ ​of​ ​1898 
was​ ​that​ ​of​ ​a​ ​civilizer​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world’s​ ​problems​ ​and​ ​a​ ​regulator​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Western​ ​hemisphere.​ ​It​ ​was 
only​ ​logical​ ​for​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​elected​ ​Taft​ ​administration​ ​to​ ​send​ ​the​ ​Marine​ ​Corps​ ​to​ ​Nicaragua​ ​in 
1912,​ ​which​ ​occupied​ ​the​ ​country​ ​and​ ​enforced​ ​conservative​ ​rule​ ​until​ ​1925​ ​(31).  
By​ ​stabilizing​ ​Nicaragua​ ​with​ ​the​ ​threat​ ​of​ ​force​ ​during​ ​the​ ​16​ ​year​ ​occupation,​ ​Marine 
Corps​ ​presence​ ​allowed​ ​for​ ​the​ ​wide​ ​gap​ ​between​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​richest​ ​and​ ​poorest​ ​sectors​ ​to 
continue​ ​to​ ​grow,​ ​while​ ​solidifying​ ​the​ ​status​ ​of​ ​the​ ​​cafetalero​ ​​class​ ​as​ ​powerful​ ​and​ ​ruling. 
Sensing​ ​growing​ ​division,​ ​American​ ​General​ ​Calvin​ ​B.​ ​Carter​ ​established​ ​and​ ​trained​ ​the 
Nicaraguan​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​(38).​ ​Civil​ ​war​ ​erupted​ ​anew​ ​following​ ​the​ ​Marines’​ ​departure​ ​in 
1926,​ ​however​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​created​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​gave​ ​the​ ​conservatives​ ​a​ ​slight​ ​upper​ ​hand 
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until​ ​the​ ​return​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Marines​ ​a​ ​year​ ​later.​ ​In​ ​1928,​ ​the​ ​Espino-Negro​ ​ceasefire​ ​agreement 
allowed​ ​for​ ​the​ ​current​ ​conservative​ ​president​ ​Adolfo​ ​Díaz​ ​to​ ​finish​ ​his​ ​term,​ ​while​ ​ensuring 
liberal​ ​general​ ​José​ ​María​ ​Moncada​ ​the​ ​next​ ​term.​ ​While​ ​this​ ​pact​ ​was​ ​hailed​ ​as​ ​an 
unprecedented​ ​diplomatic​ ​solution​ ​in​ ​a​ ​historically​ ​war-torn​ ​country,​ ​the​ ​continued​ ​plight​ ​of​ ​the 
country’s​ ​rural​ ​poor​ ​combined​ ​with​ ​the​ ​status​ ​of​ ​the​ ​agreement​ ​as​ ​negotiated​ ​by​ ​American 
outsiders​ ​led​ ​to​ ​its​ ​widespread​ ​unpopularity.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​for​ ​these​ ​reasons​ ​that​ ​a​ ​guerrilla​ ​faction​ ​of 
liberal​ ​generals​ ​led​ ​by​ ​Augusto​ ​Sandino​ ​refused​ ​to​ ​sign​ ​the​ ​pact​ ​and​ ​continued​ ​waging​ ​a 




2.2-​ ​Augusto​ ​Sandino​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Rise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Somozas 
Economic​ ​plight,​ ​enormous​ ​class​ ​differences,​ ​and​ ​military​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States 
Marines​ ​generated​ ​a​ ​mixed​ ​response​ ​among​ ​the​ ​liberal​ ​camp​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua​ ​following​ ​the 
1926-1928​ ​civil​ ​war.​ ​While​ ​some​ ​liberal​ ​generals​ ​were​ ​enraged​ ​and​ ​refused​ ​to​ ​accept​ ​the 
conditions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Espino-​ ​Negro​ ​pact,​ ​others​ ​saw​ ​it​ ​as​ ​an​ ​opportunity​ ​to​ ​expand​ ​their​ ​role​ ​in​ ​the 
shaky​ ​government.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​in​ ​this​ ​context​ ​that​ ​Augusto​ ​Cesar​ ​Sandino​ ​and​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza 
Garcia,​ ​two​ ​men​ ​whose​ ​legacies​ ​would​ ​agitate​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​society​ ​for​ ​decades,​ ​became 
enemies​ ​(Booth,​ ​41). 
Sandino,​ ​who​ ​was​ ​an​ ​illegitimate​ ​son​ ​of​ ​a​ ​wealthy​ ​white​ ​landowner​ ​and​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the 
families’​ ​indigenous​ ​servants,​ ​had​ ​grown​ ​up​ ​witnessing​ ​brutal​ ​military​ ​interventions​ ​by​ ​the 
United​ ​States​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​fierce​ ​repression​ ​by​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​own​ ​government​ ​in​ ​a​ ​politically 
unstable​ ​era.​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza,​ ​while​ ​assuming​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​liberal​ ​ideology​ ​to​ ​that​ ​of​ ​Sandino, 
was​ ​a​ ​product​ ​of​ ​the​ ​emergent,​ ​new-money​ ​​cafetalero​ ​​class,​ ​and​ ​saw​ ​political​ ​influence​ ​as​ ​an 
opportunity​ ​to​ ​secure​ ​his​ ​family’s​ ​wealth​ ​and​ ​status.​ ​From​ ​the​ ​signing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Espino-Negro​ ​Pact 
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in​ ​1928​ ​until​ ​1933,​ ​Sandino​ ​and​ ​his​ ​guerrilla​ ​factions,​ ​mainly​ ​composed​ ​of​ ​poor​ ​farmers,​ ​fought 
against​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​and​ ​Marine​ ​Corps​ ​battalions​ ​on​ ​the​ ​platform​ ​of​ ​anti-interventionism​ ​in 
the​ ​mountains​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​only​ ​after​ ​the​ ​Marines​ ​oversaw​ ​the​ ​election​ ​of​ ​Juan​ ​Bautista 
Sacasa​ ​in​ ​1933​ ​and​ ​their​ ​subsequent​ ​departure​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Great​ ​Depression​ ​that​ ​Sandino 
signed​ ​a​ ​ceasefire​ ​agreement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Sacasa​ ​administration.​ ​While​ ​agreements​ ​had​ ​been 
made​ ​to​ ​put​ ​down​ ​arms,​ ​anti-interventionist​ ​sentiments​ ​were​ ​still​ ​strong​ ​and​ ​threatening, 
motivating​ ​Somoza​ ​to​ ​murder​ ​Sandino​ ​following​ ​a​ ​meeting​ ​between​ ​Sandino​ ​and​ ​Sacasa​ ​in 
1934​ ​(51).​ ​With​ ​Sandino’s​ ​death,​ ​guerrilla​ ​warfare​ ​became​ ​much​ ​less​ ​threatening​ ​to​ ​the 
National​ ​Guard,​ ​and​ ​several​ ​influential​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Guard​ ​immediately​ ​began​ ​to​ ​favor 
Somoza​ ​as​ ​their​ ​next​ ​commander.​ ​As​ ​well​ ​as​ ​gaining​ ​the​ ​trust​ ​of​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard,​ ​Somoza 
was​ ​endorsed​ ​by​ ​United​ ​States​ ​ambassador​ ​to​ ​Nicaragua​ ​Matthew​ ​Hanna,​ ​effectively​ ​securing 
him​ ​the​ ​position​ ​(46).  
As​ ​the​ ​international​ ​Great​ ​Depression​ ​began​ ​to​ ​devastate​ ​Nicaragua,​ ​labor​ ​unions 
began​ ​to​ ​form​ ​across​ ​the​ ​country,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Workers​ ​Party​ ​(Partido​ ​del​ ​Trabajador 
Nacional,​ ​PTN)​ ​was​ ​founded.​ ​Feeling​ ​increasingly​ ​threatened,​ ​conservatives​ ​began​ ​to​ ​see 
Somoza​ ​as​ ​the​ ​only​ ​solution​ ​to​ ​protect​ ​their​ ​interests,​ ​and​ ​with​ ​his​ ​newfound​ ​power​ ​and 
popularity​ ​he​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​unseat​ ​Sacasa​ ​in​ ​a​ ​1936​ ​coup​ ​d’etat​ ​to​ ​assume​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​(62). 
Throughout​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1930s,​ ​individual​ ​landholders​ ​accumulated​ ​staggering​ ​amounts​ ​of 
debt​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Great​ ​Depression,​ ​and​ ​foreclosure​ ​led​ ​to​ ​the​ ​concentration​ ​of​ ​this​ ​land​ ​among​ ​a 
few​ ​wealthy​ ​families.​ ​The​ ​following​ ​decade,​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​economy​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​recover​ ​as​ ​coffee 
and​ ​other​ ​exports​ ​were​ ​in​ ​high​ ​demand​ ​due​ ​to​ ​World​ ​War​ ​II.​ ​German​ ​owned​ ​land,​ ​which​ ​had 
been​ ​purchased​ ​as​ ​far​ ​back​ ​as​ ​the​ ​1860s​ ​and​ ​constituted​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​arable​ ​territory​ ​in 
Nicaragua,​ ​was​ ​appropriated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​family​ ​and​ ​distributed​ ​among​ ​family​ ​members​ ​and 
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allies​ ​of​ ​the​ ​regime.​ ​For​ ​these​ ​reasons,​ ​although​ ​the​ ​economy​ ​recovered,​ ​it​ ​had​ ​come​ ​to​ ​serve 
only​ ​a​ ​small​ ​sector​ ​of​ ​the​ ​population,​ ​and​ ​inequality​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​grow. 
By​ ​the​ ​1950s,​ ​Nicaragua​ ​had​ ​come​ ​to​ ​closely​ ​resemble​ ​the​ ​Cuba​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​era: 
inequality​ ​was​ ​raging,​ ​politics​ ​were​ ​controlled​ ​by​ ​a​ ​landowning​ ​elite,​ ​and​ ​bribery​ ​of​ ​public 
officials​ ​by​ ​illegal​ ​gambling​ ​and​ ​prostitution​ ​rings​ ​was​ ​common.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​these 
rings​ ​were​ ​owned​ ​by​ ​wealthy​ ​Americans.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​for​ ​these​ ​reasons​ ​that​ ​in​ ​1956,​ ​Anastasio 
Somoza​ ​Garcia​ ​was​ ​assassinated​ ​at​ ​a​ ​party​ ​in​ ​the​ ​city​ ​of​ ​León​ ​by​ ​a​ ​known​ ​opponent​ ​of​ ​the 
regime,​ ​Rigoberto​ ​Lopez​ ​Pérez​ ​(67).​ ​The​ ​country’s​ ​leadership​ ​was​ ​immediately​ ​taken​ ​over​ ​by 
Somoza’s​ ​sons,​ ​first​ ​Luis​ ​and​ ​later​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza​ ​Debayle,​ ​and​ ​qualms​ ​against​ ​their 
family’s​ ​rule​ ​subsided​ ​slightly.​ ​While​ ​Anastasio’s​ ​ruling​ ​style​ ​resembled​ ​the​ ​authoritarianism​ ​of 
his​ ​father,​ ​Luis​ ​governed​ ​more​ ​charismatically,​ ​convincing​ ​many​ ​that​ ​the​ ​true​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the 
current​ ​regime​ ​was​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​democratic.​ ​While​ ​anti-regime​ ​sentiments​ ​had​ ​weakened,​ ​however, 
many​ ​viewed​ ​Somoza’s​ ​assassination​ ​as​ ​a​ ​testament​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extreme​ ​living​ ​conditions 
thousands​ ​of​ ​Nicaraguans​ ​found​ ​themselves​ ​in.​ ​In​ ​1961,​ ​Marxist-Leninist​ ​groups​ ​in​ ​the 
university​ ​cities​ ​of​ ​Managua​ ​and​ ​León​ ​began​ ​to​ ​form​ ​under​ ​Carlos​ ​Fonseca,​ ​Silvio​ ​Mayorga, 
and​ ​Tomás​ ​Borge.​ ​Composed​ ​mainly​ ​of​ ​students,​ ​these​ ​groups​ ​began​ ​to​ ​organize​ ​under 
Augusto​ ​Sandino’s​ ​former​ ​banner,​ ​and​ ​adopted​ ​the​ ​name​ ​of​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Sandinist​ ​Liberation 
Front​ ​(Frente​ ​Sandinista​ ​de​ ​Liberación​ ​Nacional,​ ​FSLN).​ ​By​ ​1963,​ ​FSLN​ ​uprisings​ ​had​ ​been 
mostly​ ​crushed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard,​ ​however​ ​increased​ ​repressive​ ​tactics​ ​such​ ​as​ ​torture​ ​and 
imprisonment​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​regime​ ​kept​ ​FSLN​ ​support​ ​alive.​ ​In​ ​1967,​ ​Luis​ ​Somoza​ ​Debayle 
died​ ​from​ ​a​ ​heart​ ​attack,​ ​and​ ​fear​ ​of​ ​increased​ ​authoritarianism​ ​without​ ​Luis​ ​as​ ​a​ ​mediator​ ​led​ ​to 
another​ ​FSLN​ ​uprising.​ ​At​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​FSLN​ ​leaders​ ​were​ ​overly​ ​ambitious​ ​in​ ​their​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​make 
an​ ​impact​ ​on​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​were​ ​defeated​ ​once​ ​again,​ ​this​ ​time​ ​with​ ​heavy​ ​casualties 
including​ ​founding​ ​member​ ​Silvio​ ​Mayorga​ ​(140).  
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Following​ ​their​ ​1967​ ​defeat,​ ​Sandinista​ ​support​ ​grew​ ​drastically​ ​among​ ​the​ ​country’s 
northern​ ​rural​ ​regions,​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​increased​ ​repressive​ ​tactics​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​government​ ​in 
those​ ​regions.​ ​In​ ​1972,​ ​a​ ​devastating​ ​earthquake​ ​in​ ​Managua​ ​opened​ ​the​ ​eyes​ ​of​ ​many​ ​to​ ​the 
abuses​ ​of​ ​power​ ​by​ ​the​ ​government,​ ​as​ ​foreign​ ​aid​ ​was​ ​severely​ ​embezzled.​ ​Two​ ​years​ ​later 
the​ ​FSLN​ ​remobilized,​ ​this​ ​time​ ​with​ ​an​ ​urban​ ​presence​ ​and​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​goal.​ ​When​ ​Sandinistas 
took​ ​several​ ​politicians​ ​hostage​ ​at​ ​a​ ​house​ ​party​ ​in​ ​León,​ ​they​ ​were​ ​able​ ​to​ ​win​ ​$5​ ​million​ ​in 
concessions​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​freedom​ ​of​ ​18​ ​political​ ​prisoners,​ ​including​ ​future​ ​president​ ​Daniel 
Ortega.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​regime​ ​declared​ ​a​ ​state​ ​of​ ​siege​ ​on​ ​the​ ​FSLN,​ ​effectively 
imposing​ ​martial​ ​law​ ​on​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​country​ ​and​ ​employing​ ​repressive​ ​tactics​ ​freely.​ ​The​ ​FSLN​ ​at 
this​ ​point​ ​had​ ​grown​ ​popular​ ​and​ ​powerful​ ​due​ ​to​ ​mentorship​ ​by​ ​veterans​ ​of​ ​the​ ​various 
previous​ ​mobilizations.​ ​In​ ​response​ ​to​ ​growing​ ​yet​ ​hesitant​ ​support,​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​in​ ​1975​ ​shifted​ ​in 
ideology​ ​from​ ​Marxism-Leninism​ ​to​ ​Democratic​ ​Socialism,​ ​a​ ​change​ ​that​ ​garnered​ ​huge​ ​public, 
as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​international,​ ​support​ ​(146).  
 
 
2.3-​ ​The​ ​Role​ ​of​ ​Women​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Revolution 
 
By​ ​the​ ​1970s,​ ​despite​ ​brief​ ​interruptions​ ​by​ ​figure-holding​ ​presidents,​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​family 
had​ ​effectively​ ​ruled​ ​Nicaragua​ ​for​ ​40​ ​years.​ ​At​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​the​ ​Somoza’s​ ​owned​ ​a​ ​larger 
proportion​ ​of​ ​land,​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​national​ ​industry,​ ​than​ ​any​ ​other​ ​single​ ​family.​ ​With​ ​cotton​ ​and 
coffee​ ​being​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​primary​ ​exports,​ ​the​ ​national​ ​economy​ ​was​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​American 
and​ ​multinational​ ​corporations,​ ​and​ ​agricultural​ ​workers​ ​were​ ​reimbursed​ ​very​ ​little.​ ​Due​ ​to 
economic​ ​pressures,​ ​men​ ​commonly​ ​abandoned​ ​their​ ​families,​ ​forcing​ ​women​ ​to​ ​take​ ​any​ ​work 
available​ ​to​ ​them,​ ​including​ ​selling​ ​homemade​ ​baked​ ​goods​ ​and​ ​trinkets,​ ​farm​ ​work,​ ​and​ ​even 
prostitution.​ ​At​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time,​ ​mounting​ ​repressive​ ​tactics​ ​had​ ​been​ ​employed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza 
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regime​ ​in​ ​rural​ ​areas​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​increasing​ ​insurgent​ ​behavior​ ​by​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​and​ ​indigenous 
opposition​ ​groups.​ ​Seemingly​ ​random​ ​disappearances​ ​of​ ​men​ ​of​ ​all​ ​ages​ ​had​ ​become 
commonplace,​ ​effectively​ ​leaving​ ​families​ ​without​ ​a​ ​breadwinner.​ ​Young​ ​people​ ​were​ ​commonly 
targeted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​as​ ​most​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​be​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​some​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​resistance​ ​efforts, 
and​ ​many​ ​women​ ​therefore​ ​lost​ ​their​ ​children​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Somoza’s​ ​suspicious​ ​precautions​ ​(Randall, 
v).  
In​ ​1977,​ ​women​ ​occupied​ ​approximately​ ​30%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​wage​ ​earning​ ​workforce​ ​in 
Nicaragua.​ ​This​ ​figure​ ​is​ ​much​ ​higher​ ​than​ ​most​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​countries​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time,​ ​and​ ​is 
comparable​ ​to​ ​industrialized​ ​nations​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​U.S.​ ​or​ ​Canada​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1970s.​ ​While​ ​Spanish 
and​ ​Roman​ ​Catholic​ ​tradition​ ​kept​ ​women’s​ ​work​ ​domestic​ ​in​ ​other​ ​agriculture-based​ ​Latin 
American​ ​economies,​ ​wealth​ ​inequality​ ​and​ ​political​ ​repression​ ​forced​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​women​ ​into 
the​ ​workplace​ ​(vi).​ ​Along​ ​with​ ​witnessing​ ​abuses​ ​against​ ​their​ ​family​ ​members,​ ​social 
participation​ ​by​ ​women​ ​in​ ​the​ ​workplace​ ​laid​ ​the​ ​foundation​ ​for​ ​women’s​ ​political​ ​involvement​ ​in 
opposition​ ​against​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​regime,​ ​and​ ​working​ ​women​ ​who​ ​formed​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​pillars​ ​of 
their​ ​families​ ​felt​ ​the​ ​need​ ​to​ ​become​ ​directly​ ​involved​ ​due​ ​to​ ​their​ ​first-hand​ ​experiences​ ​of 
inequality​ ​(vii).​ ​Due​ ​to​ ​these​ ​pressures,​ ​a​ ​small​ ​group​ ​of​ ​women​ ​led​ ​by​ ​Lea​ ​Guido​ ​and​ ​Gloria 
Carrion​ ​began​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​meetings​ ​in​ ​1977​ ​and​ ​eventually​ ​formed​ ​the​ ​Association​ ​of​ ​Women 
Confronting​ ​the​ ​Nation’s​ ​Problems​ ​(Asociación​ ​de​ ​Mujeres​ ​ante​ ​la​ ​Problemática​ ​Nacional, 
AMPRONAC).​ ​At​ ​first,​ ​the​ ​organization​ ​was​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​informing​ ​citizens​ ​of​ ​their​ ​rights​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as 
spreading​ ​information​ ​in​ ​cities​ ​about​ ​repression​ ​that​ ​was​ ​taking​ ​place​ ​in​ ​rural​ ​areas.​ ​Originally 
mainly​ ​composed​ ​of​ ​middle​ ​class​ ​women,​ ​very​ ​few​ ​members​ ​were​ ​also​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​the​ ​FSLN, 
however​ ​when​ ​Somoza​ ​increased​ ​“Anti-terrorist​ ​efforts”​ ​across​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​country​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fear 
of​ ​increased​ ​guerrilla​ ​activities​ ​following​ ​the​ ​withdrawal​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​aid​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Carter 
administration,​ ​cross​ ​sectional​ ​involvement​ ​increased.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​early​ ​efforts​ ​at​ ​addressing 
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human​ ​rights​ ​abuses​ ​drew​ ​the​ ​support​ ​of​ ​many​ ​church​ ​groups,​ ​which​ ​were​ ​often​ ​harassed​ ​and 
whose​ ​members​ ​were​ ​interrogated​ ​by​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​due​ ​to​ ​regime​ ​suspicions 
of​ ​religious​ ​organizations​ ​in​ ​general​ ​(Randall,​ ​5).  
In​ ​1978,​ ​Pedro​ ​Joaquin​ ​Chamorro​ ​Cardenal,​ ​the​ ​editor​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​only​ ​opposition 
newspaper,​ ​​La​ ​Prensa​,​ ​was​ ​murdered​ ​by​ ​unknown​ ​gunmen.​ ​Although​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza 
claimed​ ​his​ ​death​ ​had​ ​come​ ​at​ ​the​ ​hands​ ​of​ ​business​ ​owners​ ​whom​ ​he​ ​had​ ​ridiculed,​ ​a​ ​vast 
majority​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​rejected​ ​this​ ​excuse.​ ​Riots​ ​broke​ ​out​ ​in​ ​the​ ​streets​ ​of​ ​Managua,​ ​and 
because​ ​of​ ​​La​ ​Prensa’s​​ ​conservative​ ​nature,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​its​ ​readers​ ​who​ ​were​ ​middle​ ​class​ ​women 
decided​ ​to​ ​join​ ​AMPRONAC.​ ​With​ ​newfound​ ​middle​ ​class​ ​support​ ​and​ ​an​ ​increasing​ ​audience, 
leaders​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organization​ ​were​ ​able​ ​to​ ​inform​ ​its​ ​members​ ​about​ ​forced​ ​disappearances​ ​and 
torture​ ​of​ ​members​ ​of​ ​indigenous​ ​communities​ ​(6).​ ​A​ ​general​ ​strike​ ​was​ ​organized​ ​by​ ​middle 
class​ ​members​ ​of​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​Christian​ ​organizations​ ​and​ ​other​ ​bourgeois 
opposition​ ​groups,​ ​however​ ​it​ ​was​ ​largely​ ​unsuccessful​ ​in​ ​its​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​restrain​ ​the​ ​national 
economy​ ​and​ ​financial​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government.​ ​​ ​Frustration​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​the​ ​failed​ ​strike​ ​by 
lower-​ ​and​ ​working-​ ​class​ ​opposition​ ​members​ ​translated​ ​into​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​membership​ ​and 
organization​ ​of​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​to​ ​mainly​ ​working​ ​class​ ​and​ ​poor​ ​women,​ ​leading​ ​the​ ​organization 
to​ ​join​ ​the​ ​United​ ​People’s​ ​Movement​ ​(Movimiento​ ​Pueblo​ ​Unido,​ ​MPU),​ ​an​ ​umbrella 
organization​ ​of​ ​opposition​ ​groups​ ​to​ ​which​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​belonged.​ ​Accompanying​ ​this​ ​shift​ ​in 
ideology​ ​and​ ​membership​ ​came​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​tactics:​ ​at​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​had​ ​grown​ ​so 
popular​ ​throughout​ ​Nicaragua​ ​that​ ​its​ ​primary​ ​objective​ ​shifted​ ​from​ ​organizing​ ​women​ ​to 
address​ ​the​ ​nation’s​ ​general​ ​problems,​ ​to​ ​organizing​ ​anyone​ ​in​ ​opposition​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Somoza 
regime​ ​(7).  
By​ ​1979,​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​was​ ​a​ ​militant​ ​organization​ ​with​ ​close​ ​ties​ ​to​ ​the​ ​FSLN.​ ​Women, 
through​ ​their​ ​increased​ ​involvement​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​and​ ​following​ ​the​ ​formation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organization,​ ​had 
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increased​ ​their​ ​presence​ ​in​ ​militant​ ​activities​ ​throughout​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​decade​ ​to​ ​the​ ​point​ ​where 
30%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​was​ ​comprised​ ​of​ ​female​ ​members​ ​(Randall,​ ​iv).​ ​While​ ​many​ ​women​ ​were 
nurses​ ​and​ ​aided​ ​wounded​ ​fighters,​ ​others​ ​became​ ​rank​ ​and​ ​file​ ​guerrillas,​ ​fighting​ ​on​ ​the​ ​front 
line​ ​along​ ​with​ ​men.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​several​ ​officers​ ​in​ ​the​ ​revolution​ ​were​ ​women,​ ​at​ ​times 
commanding​ ​battalions​ ​of​ ​several​ ​hundreds​ ​of​ ​men​ ​and​ ​women.​ ​Women​ ​who​ ​were​ ​not​ ​involved 
in​ ​fighting​ ​and​ ​militant​ ​activities​ ​played​ ​a​ ​large​ ​role​ ​in​ ​the​ ​revolution​ ​by​ ​writing​ ​letters​ ​to​ ​families 
of​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​pointing​ ​out​ ​the​ ​paradoxes​ ​of​ ​their​ ​motives​ ​and​ ​thus 
weakening​ ​their​ ​morale,​ ​setting​ ​up​ ​medical​ ​clinics​ ​in​ ​neighborhoods​ ​where​ ​street​ ​fighting​ ​was 
rampant​ ​and​ ​civilians​ ​were​ ​targeted,​ ​and​ ​delivering​ ​groceries​ ​to​ ​poor​ ​rural​ ​and​ ​urban 
communities​ ​whose​ ​access​ ​to​ ​food​ ​was​ ​cut​ ​off​ ​due​ ​to​ ​fighting.​ ​Through​ ​their​ ​involvement​ ​in 
political​ ​activities,​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​family​ ​life​ ​changed​ ​as​ ​women​ ​commonly​ ​became​ ​less 
submissive​ ​and​ ​more​ ​active​ ​in​ ​decision​ ​making​ ​processes​ ​of​ ​their​ ​households.​ ​Women​ ​were 
developing​ ​a​ ​new​ ​type​ ​of​ ​social​ ​life​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua,​ ​so​ ​much​ ​so​ ​that​ ​by​ ​the​ ​time​ ​the​ ​Somoza’s​ ​had 
been​ ​ousted,​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government​ ​led​ ​by​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​assigned​ ​several​ ​government​ ​agencies​ ​to 
be​ ​taken​ ​over​ ​by​ ​the​ ​leaders​ ​of​ ​the​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​(Randall,​ ​23).  
In​ ​1980,​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​changed​ ​its​ ​name​ ​to​ ​AMNLAE​ ​(Asociación​ ​de​ ​Mujeres 
Nicaraguenses​ ​Luisa​ ​Amanda​ ​Espinoza),​ ​after​ ​Luisa​ ​Amanda​ ​Espinosa,​ ​the​ ​first​ ​woman​ ​killed 
fighting​ ​against​ ​the​ ​Somozas​ ​in​ ​1970​ ​at​ ​the​ ​age​ ​of​ ​21​ ​(24).​ ​The​ ​organization’s​ ​decision​ ​to 
change​ ​its​ ​name​ ​following​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the​ ​revolution​ ​accompanied​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​its​ ​mission​ ​to 
ensure​ ​women’s​ ​integration​ ​into​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​formed​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​society.​ ​Gloria​ ​Carrion,​ ​one​ ​of 
the​ ​founding​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organization,​ ​took​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​the​ ​General​ ​Coordinator​ ​of​ ​the 
AMNLAE​ ​(10),​ ​and​ ​Lea​ ​Guido,​ ​the​ ​group’s​ ​other​ ​founding​ ​member,​ ​became​ ​the​ ​new 
government’s​ ​Minister​ ​of​ ​Social​ ​Welfare​ ​(2).​ ​Because​ ​the​ ​war​ ​had​ ​left​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s 
infrastructure​ ​in​ ​rubble,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​services​ ​created​ ​by​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​and​ ​AMPRONAC​ ​during​ ​the 
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conflict​ ​were​ ​kept​ ​in​ ​place.​ ​The​ ​civil​ ​defense​ ​committees​ ​which​ ​had​ ​been​ ​created​ ​by​ ​the 
AMPRONAC​ ​to​ ​deliver​ ​food,​ ​supplies,​ ​and​ ​medical​ ​resources​ ​during​ ​the​ ​war​ ​were​ ​renamed 
Sandinist​ ​Defense​ ​Committees,​ ​and​ ​their​ ​structure​ ​remained​ ​largely​ ​unchanged​ ​(18).​ ​Despite 
many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​criticisms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​revolution​ ​and​ ​the​ ​reconstruction​ ​government,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​considerable​ ​to 
note​ ​that​ ​the​ ​organizations​ ​which​ ​worked​ ​to​ ​rid​ ​the​ ​nation​ ​of​ ​its​ ​authoritarian​ ​leadership​ ​did​ ​not 
dissolve​ ​once​ ​the​ ​task​ ​at​ ​hand​ ​was​ ​completed,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​continued​ ​in​ ​their​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​create​ ​a 
more​ ​wholesome​ ​and​ ​inclusive​ ​society​ ​and​ ​integrate​ ​those​ ​who​ ​had​ ​been​ ​marginalized 
throughout​ ​previous​ ​decades.  
 
 
2.4-​ ​Attempts​ ​at​ ​Diplomatic​ ​Solutions​ ​under​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter 
 
In​ ​the​ ​1970s,​ ​public​ ​life​ ​in​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​drastically​ ​changed.​ ​Largely​ ​in​ ​part​ ​due​ ​to 
the​ ​Vietnam​ ​War​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Hippie​ ​movement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​‘60s​ ​and​ ​‘70s,​ ​humanitarianism​ ​became​ ​an 
important​ ​factor​ ​in​ ​American​ ​political​ ​culture.​ ​Sensing​ ​this​ ​fundamental​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​society,​ ​Jimmy 
Carter​ ​ran​ ​his​ ​successful​ ​1976​ ​presidential​ ​campaign​ ​against​ ​Gerald​ ​Ford​ ​on​ ​a​ ​refreshing 
platform​ ​of​ ​reformist​ ​ideas.​ ​In​ ​fact,​ ​the​ ​four​ ​years​ ​of​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter’s​ ​administration​ ​were 
famously​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​peaceful​ ​for​ ​the​ ​U.S.​ ​military​ ​since​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​World​ ​War​ ​II.​ ​Carter’s 
strategy​ ​of​ ​deliberate​ ​diplomacy​ ​was​ ​also​ ​accompanied​ ​by​ ​a​ ​careful​ ​revision​ ​of​ ​states​ ​receiving 
foreign​ ​aid,​ ​an​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​his​ ​presidency​ ​that​ ​carried​ ​heavy​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​Nicaragua​ ​in​ ​the​ ​near 
future. 
In​ ​1977,​ ​the​ ​first​ ​year​ ​of​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter’s​ ​presidency,​ ​economic​ ​aid​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Somoza 
government​ ​was​ ​cut​ ​from​ ​25​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Ford​ ​years​ ​to​ ​9​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​(Booth, 
128).​ ​At​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza’s​ ​state​ ​of​ ​siege​ ​against​ ​the​ ​opposition​ ​had​ ​been​ ​in​ ​place 
for​ ​three​ ​years,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​formidable​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​seemed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​last​ ​remaining​ ​asset​ ​of​ ​the 
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Somoza​ ​regime.​ ​An​ ​Amnesty​ ​International​ ​report​ ​from​ ​July​ ​of​ ​that​ ​year​ ​which​ ​showed​ ​that 
martial​ ​law​ ​had​ ​effectively​ ​become​ ​the​ ​new​ ​way​ ​of​ ​life​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua​ ​garnered​ ​international 
disdain.​ ​Due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​siege,​ ​the​ ​suspension​ ​of​ ​civil​ ​liberties​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​imposition​ ​of​ ​curfews 
and​ ​violent​ ​interrogation​ ​of​ ​rural​ ​community​ ​and​ ​church​ ​leaders​ ​became​ ​commonplace​ ​(155).​ ​In 
September,​ ​Somoza​ ​suspended​ ​the​ ​siege​ ​at​ ​Carter’s​ ​request,​ ​leading​ ​his​ ​supporters​ ​to​ ​criticize 
him​ ​for​ ​bowing​ ​to​ ​American​ ​pressures.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​increased​ ​its​ ​military​ ​activities​ ​as 
the​ ​threat​ ​of​ ​a​ ​direct​ ​conflict​ ​with​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​military​ ​seemed​ ​less​ ​and​ ​less​ ​likely​ ​(129).  
At​ ​the​ ​1978​ ​Inter-American​ ​commission​ ​on​ ​Human​ ​Rights,​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter​ ​commended 
Anastasio​ ​Somoza​ ​by​ ​writing​ ​him​ ​a​ ​letter​ ​which​ ​honored​ ​his​ ​regime​ ​for​ ​improving​ ​the​ ​condition 
of​ ​human​ ​rights​ ​in​ ​the​ ​country​ ​after​ ​suspending​ ​the​ ​siege.​ ​While​ ​it​ ​was​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​promote 
further​ ​positive​ ​developments​ ​within​ ​the​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​government,​ ​the​ ​opposition​ ​felt​ ​that​ ​the 
letter​ ​confirmed​ ​their​ ​suspicions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US​ ​collaborating​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Somozas​ ​(130).​ ​Growing​ ​wary 
of​ ​the​ ​gradual​ ​collapse​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​regime,​ ​the​ ​Carter​ ​administration​ ​began​ ​to​ ​negotiate​ ​with 
the​ ​Broad​ ​Opposition​ ​Front​ ​(Frente​ ​Amplio​ ​de​ ​Oposición-​ ​FAO),​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​body​ ​of 
Nicaragua’s​ ​upper-​ ​and​ ​middle-​ ​class​ ​opposition.​ ​Proposals​ ​for​ ​a​ ​new​ ​government​ ​included 
plans​ ​to​ ​create​ ​a​ ​new​ ​council​ ​made​ ​up​ ​of​ ​FAO​ ​members​ ​and​ ​former​ ​government​ ​officials​ ​while 
excluding​ ​radical​ ​opposition​ ​groups,​ ​leading​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​and​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​working​ ​class​ ​to 
denounce​ ​what​ ​they​ ​labeled​ ​an​ ​imperialistic​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​install​ ​“Somocismo​ ​sin​ ​(without) 
Somoza”​ ​(179).  
By​ ​this​ ​point​ ​it​ ​was​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​Carter​ ​had​ ​underestimated​ ​the​ ​far​ ​left​ ​of​ ​the​ ​opposition​ ​and 
its​ ​organizing​ ​power,​ ​alienating​ ​its​ ​members​ ​in​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​negotiate​ ​peacefully 
(129).​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​further​ ​repression​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​regime​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​bombing​ ​of​ ​an 
indigenous​ ​community​ ​at​ ​Monimbo​ ​in​ ​1978​ ​forced​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​to​ ​fully​ ​cut​ ​all​ ​economic​ ​aid 
to​ ​Nicaragua​ ​from​ ​its​ ​1979​ ​budget.​ ​When​ ​the​ ​FAO​ ​broke​ ​off​ ​negotiations​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Carter 
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administration​ ​and​ ​put​ ​its​ ​full​ ​support​ ​behind​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​making​ ​it​ ​the​ ​main​ ​body​ ​of​ ​opposition,​ ​it 
became​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​government​ ​had​ ​lost​ ​its​ ​opportunity​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​the 
direction​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​new​ ​leadership. 
In​ ​early​ ​1979,​ ​government​ ​officials​ ​began​ ​to​ ​flee​ ​with​ ​their​ ​families​ ​to​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States, 
Honduras,​ ​Guatemala,​ ​and​ ​Costa​ ​Rica.​ ​Tax​ ​revenue​ ​collapsed​ ​and​ ​public​ ​funds​ ​were​ ​drained, 
leading​ ​the​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​Central​ ​Bank​ ​to​ ​default​ ​in​ ​March​ ​while​ ​devaluing​ ​the​ ​national​ ​currency 
and​ ​increasing​ ​the​ ​price​ ​of​ ​basic​ ​commodities.​ ​Several​ ​regional​ ​allies​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua​ ​cut​ ​relations, 
and​ ​the​ ​Organization​ ​of​ ​American​ ​States​ ​(OAS)​ ​called​ ​for​ ​Somoza’s​ ​resignation​ ​(Booth, 
166-171).​ ​When​ ​in​ ​May​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​announced​ ​its​ ​final​ ​offensive​ ​and​ ​Radio​ ​Sandino​ ​called​ ​for 
widespread​ ​civilian​ ​support​ ​to​ ​fight​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard,​ ​the​ ​Carter​ ​administration​ ​still​ ​had​ ​not 
found​ ​a​ ​vessel​ ​for​ ​influencing​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government,​ ​and​ ​modestly​ ​supported​ ​Somoza​ ​in​ ​a​ ​vain 
attempt​ ​to​ ​buy​ ​time​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​mediate​ ​negotiations.​ ​On​ ​July​ ​17th​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza​ ​Debayle 
was​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​resign​ ​as​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​purged​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​from​ ​its​ ​last​ ​stronghold​ ​in 
Managua,​ ​however​ ​the​ ​final​ ​two​ ​months​ ​during​ ​which​ ​Somoza​ ​was​ ​propped​ ​up​ ​were​ ​the​ ​most 
intense​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​fighting.​ ​Of​ ​the​ ​approximately​ ​45​ ​thousand​ ​killed​ ​between​ ​1977​ ​and​ ​1979,​ ​15 
thousand​ ​people,​ ​most​ ​of​ ​which​ ​were​ ​civilians,​ ​lost​ ​their​ ​lives​ ​during​ ​the​ ​last​ ​few​ ​weeks​ ​of 
conflict​ ​in​ ​heavily​ ​populated​ ​Managua​ ​(179).  
 
 
2.5-​ ​Revolutionary​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​Society  
When​ ​Anastasio​ ​Somoza​ ​Debayle​ ​resigned​ ​from​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​on​ ​July​ ​17th,​ ​1979, 
Nicaragua’s​ ​congress​ ​named​ ​Dr.​ ​Francisco​ ​Urcuyo​ ​Malianos,​ ​Somoza’s​ ​former​ ​vice​ ​president, 
as​ ​interim​ ​president.​ ​Naturally,​ ​his​ ​appointment​ ​was​ ​immediately​ ​rejected​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Sandinistas, 
and​ ​so​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter​ ​urged​ ​Somoza​ ​to​ ​tell​ ​Malianos​ ​to​ ​resign​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​stabilize​ ​relations​ ​with 
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the​ ​new​ ​government.​ ​Malianos​ ​responded​ ​by​ ​announcing​ ​his​ ​intentions​ ​to​ ​finish​ ​Somoza’s​ ​term, 
which​ ​sparked​ ​massive​ ​protests​ ​and​ ​he​ ​was​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​flee​ ​after​ ​having​ ​served​ ​only​ ​one​ ​day​ ​as 
president​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua​ ​(180).  
The​ ​new​ ​government​ ​was​ ​a​ ​five​ ​person​ ​council​ ​of​ ​FSLN​ ​members​ ​Daniel​ ​Ortega, 
Moises​ ​Hassan,​ ​and​ ​Sergio​ ​Ramirez,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​conservative​ ​businessman​ ​Alfonso​ ​Robelo​ ​and 
the​ ​wife​ ​of​ ​the​ ​murdered​ ​editor​ ​of​ ​​La​ ​Prensa​,​ ​Violeta​ ​Barrios​ ​de​ ​Chamorro.​ ​Calling​ ​itself​ ​the 
Junta​ ​of​ ​National​ ​Reconstruction,​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government​ ​was​ ​tasked​ ​with​ ​repairing​ ​a​ ​country 
ravaged​ ​by​ ​war​ ​while​ ​inheriting​ ​massive​ ​debt.​ ​Besides​ ​the​ ​daunting​ ​task​ ​of​ ​reconstruction,​ ​the 
goal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​revolution​ ​was​ ​to​ ​fundamentally​ ​restructure​ ​society​ ​to​ ​serve​ ​a​ ​greater​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​the 
population.​ ​Under​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​family​ ​rule,​ ​unemployment​ ​had​ ​reached​ ​22%​ ​with​ ​another​ ​35% 
of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​underemployed,​ ​literacy​ ​levels​ ​did​ ​not​ ​exceed​ ​40%,​ ​and​ ​rural​ ​literacy​ ​stayed​ ​at 
around​ ​7%.​ ​Only​ ​5%​ ​of​ ​adults​ ​were​ ​educated​ ​past​ ​fifth​ ​grade,​ ​and​ ​higher​ ​education​ ​was 
reserved​ ​for​ ​the​ ​rich​ ​with​ ​only​ ​.3%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​having​ ​access​ ​to​ ​a​ ​university​ ​education. 
Furthermore,​ ​the​ ​government​ ​lacked​ ​a​ ​central​ ​health​ ​care​ ​system​ ​and​ ​doctors​ ​were​ ​expensive, 
rare,​ ​and​ ​under​ ​trained.​ ​Infant​ ​mortality​ ​rates​ ​were​ ​very​ ​high​ ​and​ ​many​ ​poor​ ​people​ ​died​ ​from 
curable​ ​diseases,​ ​keeping​ ​national​ ​life​ ​expectancy​ ​no​ ​higher​ ​than​ ​53​ ​years​ ​(Randall,​ ​v).​ ​While 
living​ ​under​ ​such​ ​abysmal​ ​conditions,​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​still​ ​relied​ ​on​ ​multinational 
corporations​ ​and​ ​industry​ ​owned​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​family.​ ​Widespread​ ​corruption​ ​and​ ​financial 
dependence​ ​on​ ​coffee​ ​and​ ​cotton​ ​exports​ ​under​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​extreme​ ​wealth​ ​inequality​ ​were 
thus​ ​viewed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​opposition​ ​as​ ​the​ ​source​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​plight. 
In​ ​direct​ ​contrast​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​dynasty,​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government’s​ ​primary​ ​goals​ ​were​ ​to 
create​ ​an​ ​independent​ ​and​ ​non-aligned​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​and​ ​to​ ​nurture​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​a 
mixed​ ​economy,​ ​with​ ​both​ ​a​ ​strong​ ​private​ ​and​ ​public​ ​sector​ ​(Skidmore​ ​and​ ​Smith,​ ​376).​ ​All 
Somoza-owned​ ​industry​ ​was​ ​nationalized​ ​and​ ​with​ ​it​ ​about​ ​20%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​territory, 
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however​ ​most​ ​land​ ​remained​ ​privately​ ​owned​ ​and​ ​multinational​ ​corporations​ ​were​ ​not​ ​forced 
out.​ ​The​ ​junta​ ​was​ ​invited​ ​by​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter​ ​to​ ​the​ ​White​ ​House​ ​with​ ​eight​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​in 
emergency​ ​relief​ ​and​ ​75​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​later​ ​allocated​ ​by​ ​Congress​ ​to​ ​spur​ ​private​ ​sector 
growth,​ ​and​ ​2500​ ​Cuban​ ​doctors​ ​and​ ​engineers​ ​came​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country​ ​to​ ​help​ ​raise​ ​living 
standards.​ ​Unlike​ ​revolutionary​ ​Cuba,​ ​Nicaragua​ ​was​ ​not​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​a​ ​single​ ​patron​ ​nation 
like​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union,​ ​and​ ​instead​ ​received​ ​huge​ ​amounts​ ​of​ ​aid​ ​from​ ​West​ ​Germany,​ ​Spain, 
and​ ​France.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​following​ ​advice​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Castro​ ​regime,​ ​the​ ​junta​ ​consciously​ ​avoided 
alienating​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​aristocracy​ ​as​ ​had​ ​happened​ ​in​ ​Cuba​ ​(378).  
Compared​ ​with​ ​other​ ​revolutionary​ ​societies,​ ​Nicaragua​ ​was​ ​generally​ ​considered​ ​to​ ​be 
more​ ​open​ ​and​ ​democratic​ ​than​ ​most.​ ​Following​ ​the​ ​official​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​war​ ​in​ ​July​ ​1979,​ ​much​ ​of 
the​ ​population​ ​remained​ ​armed​ ​and​ ​hungry,​ ​and​ ​many​ ​counter-revolutionary​ ​bands​ ​emerged 
and​ ​incited​ ​violence​ ​in​ ​cities.​ ​Much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​established​ ​police​ ​force​ ​was​ ​under​ ​trained​ ​and 
employed​ ​increasingly​ ​repressive​ ​tactics,​ ​immediately​ ​prompting​ ​action​ ​by​ ​the​ ​government​ ​and 
other​ ​nations.​ ​A​ ​“depistolization”​ ​campaign​ ​coupled​ ​with​ ​a​ ​purge​ ​and​ ​retraining​ ​of​ ​police​ ​officers 
by​ ​Costa​ ​Rican​ ​and​ ​Panamanian​ ​security​ ​forces​ ​drastically​ ​reduced​ ​violence​ ​while​ ​easing​ ​the 
civilian​ ​population’s​ ​suspicions​ ​of​ ​authority.​ ​In​ ​1980,​ ​an​ ​investigation​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Organization​ ​of 
American​ ​States’​ ​(OAS)​ ​Inter-American​ ​Commision​ ​on​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​(IACHR)​ ​found​ ​human 
rights​ ​abuses​ ​to​ ​be​ ​very​ ​low,​ ​as​ ​many​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government​ ​including​ ​FSLN 
founding​ ​member​ ​Tomás​ ​Borge​ ​had​ ​been​ ​victims​ ​of​ ​torture​ ​under​ ​Somoza.​ ​Opposition​ ​parties 
as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​mild​ ​opposition​ ​media​ ​were​ ​allowed​ ​to​ ​exist,​ ​and​ ​censorship​ ​was​ ​low.​ ​Ironically,​ ​the 
ultra-leftist​ ​​El​ ​Pueblo​​ ​was​ ​the​ ​only​ ​newspaper​ ​to​ ​be​ ​temporarily​ ​shut​ ​down​ ​after​ ​inciting​ ​workers 
strikes​ ​for​ ​“disrupting​ ​economic​ ​recovery”​ ​(Booth,​ ​197-199). 
Once​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government​ ​had​ ​established​ ​a​ ​legitimate​ ​authority​ ​over​ ​the​ ​country, 
various​ ​steps​ ​to​ ​reorient​ ​society​ ​from​ ​overemphasized​ ​individualism​ ​to​ ​valuing​ ​social 
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collaboration​ ​were​ ​taken.​ ​In​ ​1980,​ ​student​ ​volunteers​ ​travelled​ ​through​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​rural​ ​areas 
as​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Literacy​ ​Crusade.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​illiteracy​ ​levels​ ​fell​ ​from​ ​50%​ ​to​ ​13%,​ ​and 
tens​ ​of​ ​thousands​ ​of​ ​rural​ ​poor​ ​who​ ​learned​ ​how​ ​to​ ​read​ ​were​ ​simultaneously​ ​informed​ ​of 
revolutionary​ ​values​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​political​ ​participation​ ​(Stansifer,​ ​1).​ ​The​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​a 
universal​ ​“social​ ​salary”​ ​gained​ ​popularity,​ ​and​ ​many​ ​felt​ ​that​ ​citizens​ ​should​ ​benefit​ ​from​ ​the 
government​ ​through​ ​an​ ​overall​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​quality​ ​of​ ​life.​ ​As​ ​such,​ ​a​ ​minimum​ ​wage​ ​was 
established,​ ​health​ ​and​ ​safety​ ​regulations​ ​were​ ​expanded,​ ​parks​ ​were​ ​built​ ​in​ ​poor 
neighborhoods,​ ​squatters​ ​were​ ​permitted​ ​to​ ​live​ ​on​ ​nationalized​ ​land,​ ​working​ ​mothers​ ​were 
given​ ​free​ ​day​ ​care,​ ​unions​ ​were​ ​legalized,​ ​and​ ​disability​ ​services​ ​were​ ​improved​ ​(Booth,​ ​209). 
In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​decrease​ ​bureaucratic​ ​limitations,​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Agrarian​ ​Reform​ ​Institute​ ​and​ ​the 
Ministry​ ​of​ ​Agricultural​ ​Development​ ​combined​ ​in​ ​1980.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​nutritional​ ​and​ ​health 
services​ ​for​ ​residential​ ​farm​ ​workers​ ​were​ ​expanded​ ​and​ ​subsidies​ ​for​ ​small​ ​private​ ​farmers 
increased.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​thousands​ ​of​ ​unemployed​ ​workers​ ​found​ ​construction​ ​jobs​ ​after​ ​the 
war,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​new​ ​government​ ​invested​ ​235​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​in​ ​the​ ​manufacturing​ ​sector​ ​to​ ​rebuild 
the​ ​country​ ​(205).​ ​Such​ ​changes,​ ​especially​ ​following​ ​the​ ​nationalization​ ​of​ ​all​ ​Somoza-held 
land,​ ​increased​ ​the​ ​public​ ​share​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​gross​ ​national​ ​product​ ​(GNP)​ ​from​ ​15%​ ​to​ ​41% 
in​ ​1980​ ​(203).  
 
 
2.6-​ ​Ronald​ ​Reagan​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Contra​ ​War 
In​ ​the​ ​presidential​ ​election​ ​of​ ​1980,​ ​economic​ ​anxiety​ ​in​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​against​ ​the 
backdrop​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Cold​ ​War​ ​resulted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​landslide​ ​victory​ ​for​ ​Ronald​ ​Reagan​ ​over​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter, 
who​ ​was​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​naive​ ​and​ ​indecisive.​ ​While​ ​economic​ ​issues​ ​at​ ​home​ ​largely​ ​dominated 
presidential​ ​debates,​ ​Reagan’s​ ​stance​ ​on​ ​international​ ​issues​ ​contributed​ ​significantly​ ​to​ ​his 
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headstrong​ ​and​ ​determined​ ​image.​ ​The​ ​campaign​ ​platform​ ​of​ ​the​ ​republican​ ​party​ ​in​ ​1980 
famously​ ​stated:  
“We​ ​deplore​ ​the​ ​Marxist-Sandinista​ ​take-over​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua...and​ ​we​ ​oppose​ ​the​ ​Carter 
Administration​ ​aid​ ​program​ ​for​ ​the​ ​government​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua.​ ​However,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​support​ ​the 
efforts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​people​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​a​ ​free​ ​and​ ​independent​ ​government.” 
(presidency.ucsb.edu) 
The​ ​American​ ​public​ ​viewed​ ​Reagan’s​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​objectives​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua​ ​and​ ​other 
countries​ ​as​ ​logical​ ​to​ ​protect​ ​the​ ​country​ ​from​ ​communism,​ ​and​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​the​ ​international 
spread​ ​of​ ​democracy.​ ​For​ ​Nicaragua​ ​however,​ ​where​ ​wounds​ ​were​ ​still​ ​fresh​ ​and​ ​society​ ​was​ ​in 
the​ ​midst​ ​of​ ​reconstruction,​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​“establish​ ​a​ ​free​ ​and​ ​independent​ ​government”​ ​held 
several​ ​negative​ ​connotations.  
While​ ​the​ ​overstatement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Sandinista’s​ ​failures​ ​and​ ​their​ ​vilification​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Reagan 
administration​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​address,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​worth​ ​noting​ ​as​ ​well​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Sandinista​ ​government 
was​ ​far​ ​from​ ​perfect.​ ​Similar​ ​in​ ​nature​ ​to​ ​other​ ​emergent​ ​governments​ ​following​ ​a​ ​revolution,​ ​the 
junta​ ​was​ ​often​ ​overly​ ​ambitious.​ ​In​ ​pursuit​ ​of​ ​a​ ​mixed​ ​economy​ ​certain​ ​companies​ ​were 
nationalized,​ ​which​ ​resulted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​greater​ ​public​ ​share​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nation’s​ ​wealth.​ ​However,​ ​since 
much​ ​of​ ​this​ ​land​ ​had​ ​been​ ​owned​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​family​ ​or​ ​its​ ​allies,​ ​many​ ​managers​ ​and 
company​ ​executives​ ​fled​ ​in​ ​fear​ ​of​ ​their​ ​safety,​ ​and​ ​efficiency​ ​in​ ​these​ ​industries​ ​plummeted 
(Booth,​ ​203).​ ​Furthermore,​ ​widespread​ ​famine​ ​broke​ ​out​ ​shortly​ ​after​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​war​ ​which 
saw​ ​more​ ​than​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​children​ ​malnourished.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​the​ ​government 
orchestrated​ ​“social​ ​salary”​ ​programs​ ​which​ ​led​ ​to​ ​massive​ ​inflation,​ ​yet​ ​ended​ ​the​ ​famine​ ​by 
importing​ ​food​ ​and​ ​subsidizing​ ​small​ ​farmers​ ​(207).​ ​While​ ​the​ ​early​ ​government​ ​committed 
several​ ​economic​ ​blunders​ ​and​ ​was​ ​violent​ ​at​ ​times,​ ​the​ ​Sandinistas​ ​never​ ​had​ ​total​ ​control​ ​of 
the​ ​state​ ​like​ ​the​ ​Somozas​ ​did.​ ​The​ ​values​ ​of​ ​the​ ​revolution​ ​remained​ ​popular​ ​and​ ​were​ ​widely 
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equated​ ​with​ ​a​ ​path​ ​out​ ​of​ ​misery,​ ​despite​ ​being​ ​labelled​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Reagan​ ​administration​ ​as​ ​being 
forced​ ​over​ ​the​ ​population​ ​by​ ​a​ ​totalitarian​ ​dictatorship​ ​(Grandin​ ​and​ ​Joseph,​ ​115). 
Following​ ​Ronald​ ​Reagan’s​ ​inauguration​ ​as​ ​president​ ​in​ ​1981,​ ​30​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​in​ ​loans 
to​ ​Nicaragua’s​ ​private​ ​sector​ ​were​ ​immediately​ ​cancelled,​ ​prompting​ ​another​ ​wave​ ​of 
nationalizations​ ​as​ ​private​ ​entrepreneurs​ ​could​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​sustain​ ​certain​ ​industries​ ​(Booth,​ ​180). 
That​ ​same​ ​year,​ ​19​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​were​ ​directed​ ​from​ ​the​ ​CIA​ ​to​ ​various​ ​counter-revolutionary 
groups​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​unify​ ​them​ ​under​ ​the​ ​blanket-term​ ​“contras”.​ ​Initially​ ​mainly​ ​comprised​ ​of 
former​ ​members​ ​of​ ​Somoza’s​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​who​ ​had​ ​fled​ ​the​ ​country​ ​for​ ​Honduras​ ​and 
Guatemala​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1970s,​ ​the​ ​largest​ ​of​ ​these​ ​groups​ ​was​ ​known​ ​as​ ​the 
Nicaraguan​ ​Democratic​ ​Force​ ​(Fuerza​ ​Democrática​ ​Nicaragüense-​ ​FDN)​ ​(Eich​ ​and​ ​Rincon,​ ​iii). 
While​ ​the​ ​inauguration​ ​of​ ​Ronald​ ​Reagan​ ​initiated​ ​the​ ​flow​ ​of​ ​American​ ​dollars​ ​to 
counter-revolutionary​ ​forces,​ ​many​ ​insurgent​ ​groups​ ​had​ ​already​ ​been​ ​trained​ ​by​ ​foreign 
intelligence​ ​agencies.​ ​In​ ​fact,​ ​immediately​ ​after​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​war,​ ​the​ ​Argentine​ ​secret​ ​service 
began​ ​organizing​ ​plans​ ​for​ ​insurgents​ ​to​ ​disrupt​ ​Sandinista​ ​progress.​ ​While​ ​the​ ​Argentine 
government​ ​acted​ ​independently​ ​of​ ​Reagan’s​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​objectives,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​considerable​ ​to​ ​note 
that​ ​the​ ​right​ ​wing​ ​military​ ​junta​ ​which​ ​had​ ​oppressively​ ​ruled​ ​the​ ​country​ ​since​ ​it​ ​was​ ​installed 
in​ ​a​ ​CIA-sponsored​ ​coup​ ​against​ ​Isabel​ ​Peron​ ​in​ ​1976​ ​was​ ​closely​ ​allied​ ​with​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States 
and​ ​had​ ​been​ ​amiable​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Somoza​ ​regime​ ​until​ ​1979.​ ​When​ ​the​ ​military​ ​junta​ ​began​ ​to 
destabilize​ ​in​ ​1982​ ​and​ ​Argentina​ ​was​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​cease​ ​its​ ​regional​ ​operations,​ ​the​ ​CIA​ ​was 
simply​ ​able​ ​to​ ​assume​ ​leadership​ ​over​ ​several​ ​funding​ ​structures​ ​which​ ​had​ ​already​ ​been​ ​put​ ​in 
place​ ​(Green,​ ​173).  
The​ ​first​ ​major​ ​Contra​ ​strategy​ ​to​ ​delegitimize​ ​Sandinista​ ​leadership​ ​was​ ​known​ ​as​ ​Plan 
C.​ ​From​ ​training​ ​camps​ ​in​ ​Honduras,​ ​guerrilla​ ​groups​ ​under​ ​the​ ​FDN​ ​would​ ​launch​ ​invasions 
into​ ​the​ ​northern​ ​districts​ ​of​ ​Matagalpa​ ​and​ ​Jinotega.​ ​These​ ​districts​ ​would​ ​be​ ​labeled​ ​“liberated 
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zones”,​ ​while​ ​guerrillas​ ​would​ ​destroy​ ​coffee​ ​harvests​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​undermine​ ​the​ ​government’s 
economic​ ​base.​ ​While​ ​largely​ ​unsuccessful,​ ​the​ ​FDN​ ​managed​ ​to​ ​capture​ ​several​ ​villages​ ​and 
farming​ ​co-ops​ ​with​ ​advanced​ ​military​ ​equipment​ ​such​ ​as​ ​mortars,​ ​often​ ​killing​ ​civilians​ ​and 
workers​ ​who​ ​were​ ​benefiting​ ​from​ ​newly​ ​created​ ​government​ ​programs.​ ​Plan​ ​C​ ​had​ ​been 
organized​ ​by​ ​Argentine​ ​intelligence​ ​and​ ​ran​ ​from​ ​1982​ ​to​ ​1983,​ ​and​ ​when​ ​it​ ​was​ ​abandoned​ ​a 
new​ ​plan​ ​was​ ​devised​ ​(Eich​ ​and​ ​Rincon,​ ​11).​ ​Driven​ ​by​ ​FDN​ ​leader​ ​Jorge​ ​Ramirez​ ​Zelaya​ ​who 
had​ ​trained​ ​in​ ​Argentina,​ ​the​ ​goal​ ​of​ ​Operation​ ​M83​ ​was​ ​to​ ​foster​ ​political​ ​instability​ ​by 
increasing​ ​public​ ​anxiety.​ ​Supply​ ​lines​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​communication​ ​to​ ​rural​ ​areas​ ​were​ ​cut​ ​by 
guerrilla​ ​attacks,​ ​and​ ​local​ ​leaders​ ​were​ ​targeted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​wave​ ​of​ ​assassinations.​ ​Furthermore, 
state​ ​institutions​ ​created​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Sandinistas​ ​such​ ​as​ ​schools​ ​and​ ​hospitals​ ​were​ ​subject​ ​to 
terrorist​ ​attacks​ ​like​ ​bombings​ ​and​ ​many​ ​civilians​ ​were​ ​kidnapped​ ​(13).​ ​During​ ​these​ ​first​ ​few 
years​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1980s,​ ​the​ ​Contras​ ​relied​ ​on​ ​guerrilla​ ​tactics​ ​and​ ​regional​ ​operations.​ ​Through​ ​the 
help​ ​of​ ​American​ ​and​ ​Argentine​ ​advisers​ ​and​ ​weapons,​ ​however,​ ​they​ ​were​ ​able​ ​to​ ​lay​ ​a​ ​strong 
foundation​ ​for​ ​a​ ​modern​ ​and​ ​well-equipped​ ​fighting​ ​force​ ​(Green,​ ​184).  
During​ ​the​ ​second​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​decade,​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua​ ​was​ ​no​ ​longer 
that​ ​of​ ​highland​ ​guerilla​ ​warfare,​ ​instead​ ​resembling​ ​a​ ​full-blown​ ​civil​ ​war.​ ​Contra​ ​membership 
among​ ​indigenous​ ​communities​ ​was​ ​growing​ ​as​ ​many​ ​villagers​ ​were​ ​relocated​ ​by​ ​the 
Sandinista​ ​government​ ​to​ ​camps​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​border​ ​where​ ​they​ ​would​ ​be​ ​less 
susceptible​ ​to​ ​terrorism​ ​or​ ​forced​ ​conscription.​ ​Photos​ ​were​ ​released​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Reagan 
administration​ ​showing​ ​apparent​ ​beatings​ ​and​ ​killings​ ​in​ ​indigenous​ ​communities,​ ​however 
these​ ​were​ ​later​ ​found​ ​to​ ​be​ ​of​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​members​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1970s​ ​(Booth,​ ​201).​ ​In​ ​1985,​ ​the 
United​ ​States​ ​led​ ​an​ ​international​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​Nicaragua,​ ​stifling​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​economic​ ​well 
being.​ ​Economic​ ​aid​ ​was​ ​only​ ​permitted​ ​by​ ​Congress​ ​to​ ​flow​ ​to​ ​Nicaragua​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​stop​ ​the 
flow​ ​of​ ​arms​ ​from​ ​Nicaragua​ ​to​ ​revolutionary​ ​forces​ ​in​ ​El​ ​Salvador​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Boland 
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amendments,​ ​however​ ​the​ ​Reagan​ ​administration​ ​felt​ ​that​ ​the​ ​best​ ​way​ ​to​ ​do​ ​this​ ​was​ ​to​ ​“make 
the​ ​Sandinistas​ ​say​ ​uncle”​ ​(Eich​ ​and​ ​Rincon,​ ​iii).​ ​While​ ​sponsoring​ ​the​ ​overthrow​ ​of​ ​the 
Sandinistas​ ​was​ ​forbidden,​ ​Reagan​ ​often​ ​commended​ ​the​ ​Contras​ ​as​ ​being​ ​the​ ​“Moral 
equivalent​ ​of​ ​our​ ​founding​ ​fathers”.​ ​In​ ​response​ ​to​ ​increasing​ ​attacks​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Contras​ ​in​ ​cities 
and​ ​the​ ​countryside​ ​while​ ​dealing​ ​with​ ​economic​ ​struggles​ ​caused​ ​by​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​embargo, 
the​ ​Sandinista​ ​government​ ​imposed​ ​a​ ​draft​ ​to​ ​weaken​ ​the​ ​Contras​ ​and​ ​increased​ ​military 
expenditures​ ​to​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​national​ ​budget​ ​(Skidmore​ ​and​ ​Smith,​ ​378).​ ​While​ ​these​ ​actions 
proved​ ​that​ ​the​ ​efforts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Reagan​ ​administration​ ​were​ ​working,​ ​they​ ​also​ ​presented 
difficulties​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Contras.​ ​In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​sustain​ ​Contra​ ​efforts,​ ​the​ ​CIA​ ​under​ ​William​ ​Casey​ ​and 
the​ ​National​ ​Security​ ​Council​ ​(NSC)​ ​under​ ​Oliver​ ​North​ ​orchestrated​ ​arms​ ​sales​ ​to​ ​Iran​ ​from 
1985​ ​to​ ​1987.​ ​At​ ​artificially​ ​inflated​ ​prices,​ ​Israeli​ ​smugglers​ ​sold​ ​weapons​ ​to​ ​Iran’s​ ​government 
in​ ​exchange​ ​for​ ​the​ ​release​ ​of​ ​American​ ​hostages​ ​being​ ​held​ ​hostage​ ​in​ ​Lebanon​ ​by​ ​Hezbollah 
(Green,​ ​173).​ ​Not​ ​only​ ​did​ ​this​ ​violate​ ​Congress’​ ​Boland​ ​agreement​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​the​ ​principle 
of​ ​checks​ ​and​ ​balances,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​also​ ​in​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​an​ ​economic​ ​embargo​ ​being​ ​carried​ ​out 
against​ ​Iran​ ​while​ ​betraying​ ​the​ ​famous​ ​American​ ​policy​ ​of​ ​not​ ​negotiating​ ​with​ ​terrorist 
organizations​ ​like​ ​Hezbollah. 
In​ ​1990,​ ​presidential​ ​and​ ​regional​ ​elections​ ​were​ ​held​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua.​ ​The​ ​conservative 
candidate​ ​and​ ​original​ ​member​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Junta​ ​of​ ​National​ ​Reconstruction​ ​Violeta​ ​Barrios​ ​de 
Chamorro​ ​defeated​ ​incumbent​ ​Daniel​ ​Ortega​ ​by​ ​a​ ​large​ ​margin,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​embargo 
was​ ​lifted​ ​which​ ​ended​ ​rising​ ​inflation.​ ​Leading​ ​up​ ​to​ ​the​ ​election,​ ​however,​ ​several​ ​regional 
FSLN​ ​candidates​ ​were​ ​assassinated​ ​and​ ​intimidation​ ​at​ ​polling​ ​stations​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Contras​ ​was 
common.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​the​ ​Contras​ ​threatened​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​violent​ ​activities​ ​if​ ​Daniel​ ​Ortega​ ​was 
reelected,​ ​leading​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​to​ ​vote​ ​against​ ​the​ ​FSLN​ ​in​ ​fear.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​despite 
immediately​ ​receiving​ ​one​ ​billion​ ​dollars​ ​in​ ​foreign​ ​aid​ ​and​ ​ending​ ​the​ ​draft,​ ​unemployment 
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under​ ​Violeta​ ​Barrios​ ​de​ ​Chamorro​ ​rose​ ​from​ ​12%​ ​to​ ​22%.​ ​Another​ ​28%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​population 
became​ ​underemployed,​ ​and​ ​with​ ​only​ ​40%​ ​full​ ​employment​ ​many​ ​began​ ​to​ ​nostalgically 
question​ ​how​ ​Nicaraguan​ ​society​ ​would​ ​have​ ​developed​ ​had​ ​the​ ​Sandinista​ ​government​ ​not 
been​ ​spending​ ​half​ ​of​ ​its​ ​budget​ ​on​ ​the​ ​military​ ​in​ ​its​ ​final​ ​years​ ​(Skidmore​ ​and​ ​Smith,​ ​379). 
  
 
Honduras:​ ​Bipartisan​ ​Politics​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Military 
 
3.1-​ ​​ ​The​ ​Banana​ ​Republic  
When​ ​the​ ​National​ ​War​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​Federation​ ​broke​ ​out​ ​in​ ​1838,​ ​liberal 
factions​ ​under​ ​Honduran​ ​general​ ​and​ ​president​ ​of​ ​the​ ​federation​ ​Francisco​ ​Morazan​ ​were 
forced​ ​to​ ​take​ ​up​ ​arms​ ​against​ ​conservative​ ​factions​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​separatists.​ ​Morazan​ ​had​ ​taken 
over​ ​the​ ​leadership​ ​of​ ​the​ ​federation​ ​with​ ​the​ ​noble​ ​goal​ ​of​ ​creating​ ​a​ ​powerful​ ​regional​ ​block, 
able​ ​to​ ​withstand​ ​the​ ​devastating​ ​consequences​ ​which​ ​historically​ ​had​ ​ensued​ ​when​ ​wealthy 
nations​ ​would​ ​take​ ​an​ ​interest​ ​in​ ​the​ ​region’s​ ​resources.​ ​Unfortunately,​ ​Morazan​ ​was​ ​ahead​ ​of 
his​ ​time,​ ​as​ ​Nicaragua​ ​was​ ​the​ ​first​ ​to​ ​split​ ​from​ ​the​ ​federation​ ​in​ ​1840,​ ​followed​ ​closely​ ​by 
Honduras​ ​and​ ​Costa​ ​Rica.​ ​Morazan​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​mount​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​reunify​ ​Central​ ​America, 
however​ ​he​ ​was​ ​captured​ ​and​ ​executed​ ​in​ ​1842.​ ​When​ ​Morazan​ ​died,​ ​so​ ​did​ ​any​ ​hope​ ​for 
reunification​ ​and​ ​ironically,​ ​Honduras​ ​has​ ​arguably​ ​fared​ ​the​ ​worst​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​American 
nations​ ​following​ ​the​ ​dissolution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​federation​ ​(ThoughtCo.com).  
Of​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​independent​ ​nations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​former​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​Federation,​ ​Honduras 
relied​ ​the​ ​most​ ​on​ ​agriculture​ ​as​ ​it​ ​had​ ​the​ ​lowest​ ​concentration​ ​of​ ​raw​ ​material​ ​deposits​ ​of​ ​the 
region.​ ​Therefore,​ ​when​ ​the​ ​first​ ​bananas​ ​were​ ​imported​ ​into​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​shortly​ ​after​ ​the 
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end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Civil​ ​War,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​no​ ​surprise​ ​that​ ​they​ ​had​ ​come​ ​from​ ​Honduras.​ ​Americans 
rapidly​ ​developed​ ​a​ ​taste​ ​for​ ​the​ ​exotic​ ​fruit​ ​following​ ​its​ ​introduction​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country,​ ​and 
agricultural​ ​fertility​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​weak​ ​political​ ​institutions​ ​made​ ​Honduras​ ​an​ ​attractive​ ​target​ ​for 
wealthy​ ​Americans​ ​looking​ ​to​ ​capitalize​ ​on​ ​the​ ​banana’s​ ​popularity​ ​(Striffler​ ​and​ ​Moberg,​ ​9).​ ​By 
1899,​ ​114​ ​companies​ ​were​ ​based​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​political​ ​elite​ ​selling​ ​lands 
around​ ​railroads​ ​to​ ​multinational​ ​corporation​ ​in​ ​hopes​ ​of​ ​modernizing​ ​the​ ​transportation​ ​network 
as​ ​a​ ​result.​ ​From​ ​the​ ​start,​ ​these​ ​corporations​ ​were​ ​faced​ ​with​ ​the​ ​lucrative​ ​task​ ​of​ ​buying 
bananas​ ​from​ ​small​ ​farmers​ ​and​ ​importing​ ​them​ ​to​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​at​ ​this​ ​point​ ​that​ ​the 
United​ ​Fruit​ ​Company,​ ​known​ ​today​ ​as​ ​Chiquita,​ ​began​ ​to​ ​buy​ ​out​ ​smaller​ ​banana​ ​exporting 
companies.​ ​In​ ​Honduras,​ ​United​ ​Fruit​ ​was​ ​rivaled​ ​only​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Standard​ ​Fruit​ ​Company,​ ​which 
would​ ​eventually​ ​become​ ​Dole.​ ​Fierce​ ​competition​ ​between​ ​these​ ​two​ ​banana-exporting​ ​giants 
over​ ​the​ ​American​ ​market​ ​led​ ​them​ ​to​ ​implement​ ​cost​ ​cutting​ ​measures​ ​wherever​ ​possible,​ ​a 
tactic​ ​which​ ​carried​ ​deep​ ​negative​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​a​ ​country​ ​as​ ​politically​ ​weak​ ​as​ ​Honduras. 
Both​ ​the​ ​United​ ​and​ ​Standard​ ​Fruit​ ​companies​ ​fiercely​ ​worked​ ​to​ ​lower​ ​their​ ​prices​ ​for​ ​bananas 
causing​ ​the​ ​industry​ ​to​ ​grow​ ​faster​ ​and​ ​larger​ ​than​ ​analysts​ ​had​ ​expected.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​these 
companies​ ​began​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​plantations​ ​and​ ​production​ ​centers​ ​throughout​ ​Honduras​ ​in​ ​order 
to​ ​expedite​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​exporting​ ​bananas​ ​by​ ​eliminating​ ​the​ ​need​ ​to​ ​reach​ ​out​ ​to​ ​hundreds 
of​ ​small​ ​farmers.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result,​ ​many​ ​Honduran​ ​banana​ ​farmers​ ​were​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​sell​ ​their 
increasingly​ ​costly-to-maintain​ ​land​ ​to​ ​these​ ​companies​ ​and​ ​abandon​ ​their​ ​farms,​ ​instead​ ​taking 
up​ ​jobs​ ​with​ ​the​ ​companies​ ​themselves.​ ​This​ ​massive​ ​accumulation​ ​of​ ​land​ ​by​ ​these​ ​companies 
directly​ ​tied​ ​the​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​the​ ​American​ ​economic​ ​elite​ ​to​ ​the​ ​political​ ​dealings​ ​of​ ​Honduras, 
while​ ​also​ ​pegging​ ​the​ ​social​ ​situation​ ​of​ ​Honduras​ ​to​ ​the​ ​whims​ ​of​ ​wealthy​ ​Americans​ ​(10).  
Once​ ​United​ ​and​ ​Standard​ ​Fruit​ ​had​ ​effectively​ ​bought-out​ ​the​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Honduran 
Banana​ ​exporting​ ​sector,​ ​it​ ​became​ ​price-efficient​ ​to​ ​rotate​ ​banana​ ​planting​ ​plots​ ​to​ ​cultivate 
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nutritious​ ​soil​ ​instead​ ​of​ ​growing​ ​bananas​ ​on​ ​all​ ​land​ ​holdings​ ​at​ ​all​ ​times.​ ​Furthermore, 
squatters​ ​were​ ​not​ ​permitted​ ​to​ ​settle​ ​on​ ​these​ ​empty​ ​plots​ ​of​ ​land,​ ​leading​ ​many​ ​to​ ​become 
suspicious​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​economic​ ​reliance​ ​on​ ​the​ ​banana​ ​while​ ​so​ ​much​ ​land​ ​stood​ ​empty. 
Meanwhile,​ ​continually​ ​growing​ ​demand​ ​and​ ​competition​ ​made​ ​the​ ​exploitation​ ​of​ ​plantation 
workers​ ​commonplace,​ ​and​ ​several​ ​uprisings​ ​arose​ ​throughout​ ​the​ ​early​ ​decades​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1900s. 
These​ ​uprisings​ ​were​ ​reflective​ ​of​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​first​ ​manifestations​ ​of​ ​nationalism​ ​in​ ​a​ ​country 
where​ ​two​ ​sided​ ​politics​ ​had​ ​dominated​ ​since​ ​before​ ​its​ ​inception.​ ​Unfortunately,​ ​the​ ​nationalism 
that​ ​was​ ​boiling​ ​during​ ​the​ ​early​ ​20th​ ​century​ ​developed​ ​only​ ​among​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​working 
class​ ​and​ ​poor,​ ​and​ ​was​ ​easily​ ​suppressed​ ​by​ ​both​ ​liberal​ ​and​ ​conservative​ ​elites​ ​(12).  
At​ ​this​ ​point​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​note​ ​that​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​other​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​countries,​ ​the 
Honduran​ ​political​ ​system​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​century​ ​was​ ​cemented​ ​in​ ​place​ ​by​ ​the​ ​wealth 
and​ ​power​ ​that​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​political​ ​elite​ ​had​ ​accumulated​ ​in​ ​part​ ​through​ ​dealing​ ​with 
multinational​ ​corporations​ ​and​ ​foreign​ ​investors.​ ​Unlike​ ​other​ ​countries,​ ​however,​ ​the 
liberal-conservative​ ​divide​ ​had​ ​become​ ​deeply​ ​embedded​ ​among​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​wealthy, 
upholding​ ​the​ ​false​ ​dichotomy​ ​of​ ​political​ ​culture​ ​which​ ​had​ ​existed​ ​since​ ​before​ ​the​ ​days​ ​of​ ​the 
Central​ ​American​ ​Federation.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​the​ ​illusion​ ​of​ ​political​ ​pluralism,​ ​Honduras​ ​came 
to​ ​rely​ ​entirely​ ​on​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​and​ ​its​ ​demand​ ​for​ ​the​ ​banana.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​first​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​20th 
century,​ ​87%​ ​of​ ​Honduran​ ​exports​ ​went​ ​to​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​and​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​exported 
resources,​ ​bananas​ ​constituted​ ​half.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​67%​ ​of​ ​goods​ ​imported​ ​to​ ​Honduras​ ​came 
from​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​so​ ​it​ ​is​ ​safe​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​enjoyed​ ​a​ ​lucrative​ ​relationship 
with​ ​the​ ​oppressive​ ​Honduran​ ​elite.​ ​For​ ​these​ ​reasons,​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​sent​ ​its​ ​military​ ​to​ ​the 
country​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​worker​ ​uprisings​ ​in​ ​1903,​ ​1907,​ ​1911,​ ​1912,​ ​1919,​ ​1924,​ ​and​ ​1925​ ​to 
assist​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​military​ ​in​ ​protecting​ ​the​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​United​ ​and​ ​Standard​ ​Fruit​ ​(Bucheli,​ ​9).  
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These​ ​decades​ ​were​ ​marked​ ​by​ ​several​ ​coups​ ​and​ ​rebellions,​ ​with​ ​most​ ​regimes​ ​lasting 
less​ ​than​ ​one​ ​year​ ​due​ ​to​ ​deep​ ​infighting​ ​among​ ​the​ ​liberal​ ​faction.​ ​The​ ​1932​ ​elections​ ​were 
surprisingly​ ​fair,​ ​however,​ ​transferring​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​to​ ​Tiburcio​ ​Carias,​ ​who​ ​had​ ​organized 
conservatives​ ​by​ ​creating​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Party​ ​of​ ​Honduras​ ​(Partido​ ​Nacional​ ​de​ ​Honduras-​ ​PNH). 
Carias’​ ​presidential​ ​campaign,​ ​however,​ ​had​ ​been​ ​massively​ ​financed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​United​ ​Fruit 
Company​ ​and​ ​following​ ​his​ ​election​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​seized​ ​dictatorial​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country, 
outlawing​ ​the​ ​communist​ ​party​ ​and​ ​persecuting​ ​liberals.​ ​The​ ​Great​ ​Depression​ ​and​ ​the​ ​ensuing 
decade​ ​were​ ​marked​ ​by​ ​both​ ​economic​ ​devastation​ ​due​ ​to​ ​Honduras’​ ​low​ ​export​ ​diversity,​ ​as 
well​ ​as​ ​political​ ​repression​ ​by​ ​the​ ​self-made​ ​totalitarian​ ​regime.​ ​Carias​ ​held​ ​onto​ ​power​ ​until 
1949​ ​when​ ​he​ ​voluntarily​ ​resigned,​ ​giving​ ​Manuel​ ​Galvez,​ ​his​ ​minister​ ​of​ ​war​ ​and​ ​a​ ​former 
lawyer​ ​for​ ​United​ ​Fruit,​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​(13).​ ​Galvez​ ​ruled​ ​in​ ​a​ ​repressive​ ​style​ ​as​ ​well, 
however​ ​paid​ ​more​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​social​ ​well-being​ ​than​ ​his​ ​predecessor​ ​had.​ ​While 
enacting​ ​programs​ ​for​ ​education​ ​reform​ ​and​ ​the​ ​construction​ ​of​ ​roads,​ ​he​ ​also​ ​incentivized 
coffee​ ​and​ ​cotton​ ​cultivation,​ ​diversifying​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​exports​ ​for​ ​the​ ​first​ ​time​ ​since​ ​Americans 
had​ ​taken​ ​a​ ​liking​ ​to​ ​bananas​ ​a​ ​half​ ​a​ ​century​ ​earlier​ ​(Merrill,​ ​xxvi).  
 
 
3.2-​ ​​ ​The​ ​Cold​ ​War​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​Military  
By​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​second​ ​World​ ​War,​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​could​ ​not​ ​afford​ ​to​ ​lose 
partnerships​ ​with​ ​powerful​ ​regimes,​ ​especially​ ​those​ ​located​ ​in​ ​the​ ​western​ ​hemisphere.​ ​While 
political​ ​instability​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​had​ ​led​ ​to​ ​multinational​ ​corporations​ ​gaining​ ​influence​ ​in 
governmental​ ​decisions,​ ​inequalities​ ​became​ ​deeply​ ​embedded​ ​in​ ​Honduran​ ​society.​ ​When​ ​it 
became​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union​ ​were​ ​in​ ​a​ ​race​ ​for​ ​global​ ​domination, 
the​ ​already​ ​existing​ ​political​ ​structures​ ​which​ ​had​ ​been​ ​kept​ ​in​ ​place​ ​due​ ​to​ ​multinational 
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interests​ ​became​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​vessel​ ​through​ ​which​ ​aid​ ​was​ ​delivered​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result, 
the​ ​liberal-conservative​ ​divide​ ​which​ ​had​ ​defined​ ​the​ ​status​ ​quo​ ​of​ ​Honduran​ ​politics​ ​continued 
to​ ​determine​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​the​ ​country.​ ​Sensing​ ​opportunity,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​became​ ​increasingly 
involved​ ​in​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​politics,​ ​tasking​ ​itself​ ​with​ ​fixing​ ​the​ ​disparity​ ​which​ ​had​ ​existed 
between​ ​social​ ​life​ ​and​ ​political​ ​processes​ ​due​ ​to​ ​infighting​ ​within​ ​the​ ​PNH​ ​and​ ​the​ ​liberal​ ​party 
(PLH-​ ​Partido​ ​Liberal​ ​de​ ​Honduras). 
When​ ​Manuel​ ​Galvez​ ​left​ ​Honduras​ ​in​ ​1954​ ​to​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​for​ ​a​ ​heart​ ​condition,​ ​his​ ​vice 
president​ ​Julio​ ​Lozano​ ​Díaz​ ​assumed​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​against​ ​Galvez’s​ ​wishes.​ ​Two​ ​years​ ​later 
however,​ ​Díaz​ ​was​ ​removed​ ​by​ ​a​ ​coup​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​by​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​military.​ ​This​ ​marked​ ​the​ ​first 
time​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​military​ ​had​ ​acted​ ​as​ ​an​ ​institution​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​a​ ​political​ ​party​ ​or 
president.​ ​The​ ​following​ ​year,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​permitted​ ​elections​ ​to​ ​take​ ​place,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​democratic 
political​ ​reformist​ ​by​ ​the​ ​name​ ​of​ ​Ramón​ ​Villeda​ ​Morales​ ​was​ ​elected.​ ​Leading​ ​up​ ​to​ ​the 
election​ ​of​ ​1963,​ ​it​ ​became​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​Morales’​ ​ally​ ​Ramón​ ​Ernesto​ ​Cruz,​ ​whose​ ​democratizing 
policies​ ​took​ ​Morales’​ ​a​ ​step​ ​further,​ ​would​ ​become​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​next​ ​president.​ ​Fearing​ ​a 
consolidation​ ​of​ ​power​ ​within​ ​the​ ​central​ ​government​ ​and​ ​a​ ​subsequent​ ​decline​ ​of​ ​military 
influence,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​deposed​ ​of​ ​Morales​ ​before​ ​the​ ​elections​ ​could​ ​take​ ​place,​ ​installing​ ​the 
general​ ​Oswaldo​ ​López​ ​Arellano​ ​who​ ​would​ ​rule​ ​until​ ​1971​ ​when​ ​elections​ ​were​ ​permitted​ ​once 
again.​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​after​ ​Ramón​ ​Ernesto​ ​Cruz​ ​won​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​with​ ​abundant​ ​popular 
support,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​once​ ​again​ ​decided​ ​to​ ​remove​ ​him​ ​from​ ​the​ ​presidency,​ ​replacing​ ​him​ ​in 
1972​ ​with​ ​General​ ​Arellano.​ ​Unsurprisingly,​ ​Arellano​ ​was​ ​removed​ ​by​ ​an​ ​internal​ ​coup​ ​in​ ​1975 
after​ ​a​ ​bribery​ ​scandal​ ​with​ ​the​ ​United​ ​Fruit​ ​Company,​ ​and​ ​replaced​ ​by​ ​Alberto​ ​Melgar​ ​Castro, 
also​ ​a​ ​general​ ​in​ ​the​ ​military.​ ​In​ ​1978,​ ​Castro​ ​was​ ​deposed​ ​by​ ​a​ ​final​ ​military​ ​coup,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​junta 
took​ ​over​ ​which​ ​scheduled​ ​elections​ ​for​ ​1981​ ​(Merrill,​ ​xxvii).  
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The​ ​decade​ ​of​ ​military​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government​ ​was​ ​marked​ ​by​ ​economic​ ​stagnation 
that​ ​came​ ​to​ ​define​ ​Honduras​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1970s.​ ​Agricultural​ ​production​ ​and​ ​banana​ ​exports​ ​declined 
due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​growing​ ​wealthy​ ​nations​ ​of​ ​Europe​ ​importing​ ​bananas​ ​from​ ​other​ ​tropical​ ​regions, 
such​ ​as​ ​their​ ​former​ ​colonies​ ​in​ ​Central​ ​Africa.​ ​Because​ ​of​ ​this,​ ​industrialization​ ​practically​ ​came 
to​ ​a​ ​halt​ ​and​ ​Honduras​ ​came​ ​to​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​economic​ ​aid​ ​from​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as 
remittances​ ​from​ ​ex-patriots​ ​living​ ​and​ ​working​ ​in​ ​wealthier​ ​nations​ ​(Rosenberg,​ ​2).​ ​Ironically, 
the​ ​flow​ ​of​ ​money​ ​from​ ​the​ ​North​ ​had​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​bolstering​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​public​ ​sector​ ​and 
state-owned​ ​enterprises,​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States’​ ​desperate​ ​measures​ ​to​ ​strengthen​ ​Central 
American​ ​private​ ​sectors​ ​in​ ​the​ ​face​ ​of​ ​communism.​ ​Despite​ ​the​ ​troubles​ ​which​ ​had​ ​emerged 
during​ ​the​ ​1970s,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​was​ ​not​ ​despised​ ​by​ ​the​ ​public​ ​as​ ​in​ ​other​ ​Central​ ​American 
Nations,​ ​like​ ​Somoza’s​ ​National​ ​Guard​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua.​ ​This​ ​was​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​military’s​ ​relatively 
young​ ​tradition​ ​as​ ​an​ ​independent​ ​actor,​ ​which​ ​had​ ​only​ ​been​ ​established​ ​two​ ​decades​ ​earlier 
(7).​ ​Therefore,​ ​when​ ​the​ ​country​ ​made​ ​a​ ​concentrated​ ​effort​ ​to​ ​restore​ ​civilian-democracy​ ​in 
1981,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​was​ ​granted​ ​more​ ​responsibilities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​new​ ​system​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​act​ ​as​ ​a 
conflict​ ​moderator​ ​and​ ​necessary​ ​coalition​ ​partner,​ ​further​ ​cementing​ ​its​ ​influence​ ​within​ ​the 
political​ ​system​ ​(14).  
Despite​ ​Honduras’​ ​democratic​ ​transition​ ​in​ ​1981,​ ​two​ ​defining​ ​trends​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​exist 
in​ ​Honduran​ ​politics:​ ​the​ ​false​ ​dichotomization​ ​of​ ​political​ ​issues​ ​under​ ​the​ ​labels​ ​“liberal”​ ​and 
“conservative”,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​growing​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​military​ ​in​ ​decision​ ​making​ ​processes.​ ​It 
is​ ​a​ ​testament​ ​to​ ​the​ ​scale​ ​of​ ​power​ ​that​ ​the​ ​military​ ​had​ ​amassed​ ​that​ ​since​ ​1956,​ ​every​ ​leader 
of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​has​ ​relied​ ​on​ ​the​ ​military’s​ ​consent.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​membership​ ​in​ ​the​ ​growing 
National​ ​Guard​ ​(Army​ ​branch)​ ​became​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​vessel​ ​for​ ​social​ ​mobility​ ​in​ ​the 
underemployed​ ​and​ ​under-industrialized​ ​nation,​ ​contributing​ ​to​ ​its​ ​positive​ ​reputation​ ​among​ ​the 
public​ ​(Skidmore​ ​and​ ​Smith,​ ​380).​ ​In​ ​the​ ​1980s,​ ​PLH​ ​presidents​ ​Roberto​ ​Suazo​ ​Cordova​ ​and 
 
Benz​ ​29 
José​ ​Azcona​ ​Hoyo​ ​enjoyed​ ​the​ ​support​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​due​ ​to​ ​democratic​ ​innovations 
while​ ​taking​ ​heed​ ​of​ ​the​ ​growing​ ​strength​ ​and​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​the​ ​military.​ ​For​ ​these​ ​reasons,​ ​both 
presidents​ ​aided​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​government​ ​in​ ​supporting​ ​the​ ​Contra​ ​movement​ ​against​ ​the 
newly​ ​triumphant​ ​leftist-Sandinista​ ​government​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua.​ ​US​ ​army​ ​bases​ ​and​ ​training 
camps​ ​for​ ​guerrillas​ ​began​ ​to​ ​appear​ ​in​ ​southern​ ​Honduras,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​grow,​ ​and 
the​ ​Honduran​ ​economy​ ​was​ ​flooded​ ​with​ ​American​ ​dollars​ ​(381). 
​ ​When​ ​the​ ​Contra​ ​War​ ​abruptly​ ​ended​ ​in​ ​1990​ ​with​ ​the​ ​election​ ​of​ ​Violeta​ ​Chamorro,​ ​US 
disinvestment​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​led​ ​to​ ​economic​ ​decline.​ ​By​ ​this​ ​point​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​public​ ​had 
begun​ ​to​ ​recognize​ ​the​ ​power​ ​that​ ​the​ ​military​ ​could​ ​command,​ ​however​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​crack​ ​down 
on​ ​military​ ​influence​ ​and​ ​collusion​ ​with​ ​drug​ ​traffickers​ ​were​ ​futile.​ ​In​ ​1996,​ ​liberal​ ​president 
Roberto​ ​Reina​ ​announced​ ​he​ ​would​ ​work​ ​to​ ​shrink​ ​the​ ​size​ ​of​ ​the​ ​military,​ ​and​ ​congress 
approved​ ​a​ ​constitutional​ ​amendment​ ​separating​ ​the​ ​police​ ​from​ ​the​ ​military​ ​and​ ​putting​ ​it​ ​under 
civilian​ ​control.​ ​Reina’s​ ​liberal​ ​successor​ ​Carlos​ ​Roberto​ ​Flores​ ​took​ ​steps​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​the​ ​trend 
established​ ​by​ ​Reina,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​1998​ ​a​ ​further​ ​constitutional​ ​amendment​ ​was​ ​passed,​ ​removing 
the​ ​military’s​ ​commander-in-chief​ ​and​ ​instead​ ​assigning​ ​that​ ​role​ ​to​ ​the​ ​nation’s​ ​president​ ​in 
hopes​ ​of​ ​ending​ ​the​ ​military’s​ ​status​ ​as​ ​an​ ​independent​ ​actor​ ​(freedomhouse.org).  
When​ ​in​ ​1998​ ​Honduras​ ​was​ ​devastated​ ​by​ ​Hurricane​ ​Mitch,​ ​the​ ​military​ ​was​ ​assigned 
the​ ​task​ ​of​ ​rebuilding​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​infrastructure,​ ​a​ ​plan​ ​that​ ​largely​ ​flopped.​ ​Dissatisfaction​ ​with 
the​ ​military​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​rise,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​public​ ​increasingly​ ​associated​ ​the​ ​tropical​ ​storm 
with​ ​man-made​ ​climate​ ​change​ ​due​ ​to​ ​decades​ ​of​ ​environmental​ ​destruction​ ​by​ ​multinational 
corporations.​ ​In​ ​2001,​ ​PNH​ ​candidate​ ​Ricardo​ ​Maduro​ ​was​ ​elected​ ​president​ ​and​ ​immediately 
adopted​ ​austerity​ ​policies​ ​following​ ​his​ ​inauguration​ ​in​ ​2002,​ ​in​ ​hopes​ ​of​ ​qualifying​ ​for​ ​loans 
from​ ​the​ ​International​ ​Monetary​ ​Fund​ ​(IMF).​ ​These​ ​policies​ ​prompted​ ​massive​ ​opposition 
among​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​poor​ ​and​ ​working​ ​classes,​ ​whose​ ​economic​ ​opportunities​ ​were​ ​restricted 
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despite​ ​not​ ​having​ ​contributed​ ​to​ ​economic​ ​decline​ ​or​ ​environmental​ ​devastation.​ ​Furthermore, 
they​ ​revived​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​that​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​power​ ​was​ ​shared​ ​by​ ​a​ ​triangular​ ​alliance​ ​of​ ​foreign 
investors,​ ​landowners,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​military,​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​constitutional​ ​reforms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​late​ ​‘90s.​ ​A 
movement​ ​to​ ​create​ ​an​ ​environmentally​ ​sound​ ​“New​ ​Honduras”​ ​which​ ​rejected​ ​the​ ​100​ ​year​ ​old 
status​ ​quo​ ​gained​ ​momentum,​ ​however​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country​ ​felt​ ​that​ ​this​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​attainable 
through​ ​government​ ​reform​ ​(Skidmore​ ​and​ ​Smith,​ ​382).​ ​In​ ​the​ ​2005​ ​elections,​ ​a​ ​widespread 
sense​ ​of​ ​hopelessness​ ​caused​ ​low​ ​voter​ ​turnout​ ​with​ ​less​ ​than​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​population​ ​going​ ​to 
the​ ​polls.​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​the​ ​PLH​ ​was​ ​slightly​ ​more​ ​successful​ ​in​ ​rallying​ ​voters​ ​in​ ​support​ ​of 
presidential​ ​candidate​ ​José​ ​Manuel​ ​Zelaya,​ ​despite​ ​predictions​ ​that​ ​PNH​ ​candidate​ ​and 




3.3-​ ​​ ​The​ ​Zelaya​ ​Presidency​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Coup  
José​ ​Manuel​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​presidential​ ​campaign​ ​as​ ​candidate​ ​of​ ​the​ ​PLH​ ​focused​ ​on​ ​broad 
issues​ ​like​ ​the​ ​government’s​ ​involvement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​economy​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​corruption​ ​among​ ​elected 
officials.​ ​In​ ​comparison​ ​to​ ​his​ ​conservative​ ​opponent,​ ​Porfirio​ ​“Lobo”​ ​Sosa,​ ​Zelaya​ ​did​ ​not​ ​differ 
much​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​other​ ​nations.​ ​While​ ​the​ ​PNH 
platform​ ​was​ ​characterized​ ​by​ ​hardline​ ​stances​ ​on​ ​drugs​ ​and​ ​crime​ ​and​ ​was​ ​perceived​ ​to​ ​be 
considerably​ ​right-wing,​ ​Zelaya​ ​advocated​ ​largely​ ​for​ ​the​ ​continuation​ ​of​ ​Maduro’s​ ​economic 
policies​ ​with​ ​increased​ ​civilian​ ​participation​ ​and​ ​can​ ​be​ ​described​ ​as​ ​right-of-center. 
Nevertheless,​ ​following​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​inauguration,​ ​he​ ​began​ ​to​ ​adopt​ ​increasingly​ ​left​ ​leaning 
policies,​ ​and​ ​was​ ​ousted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coup​ ​in​ ​June​ ​2009​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​his​ ​call​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​an​ ​opinion​ ​poll​ ​on 
whether​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​1982​ ​constitution​ ​should​ ​be​ ​rewritten.  
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The​ ​first​ ​year​ ​of​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​presidency​ ​was​ ​marked​ ​by​ ​very​ ​little​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Honduran 
government.​ ​As​ ​the​ ​son​ ​of​ ​a​ ​wealthy​ ​landowning​ ​family,​ ​Zelaya​ ​had​ ​taken​ ​advantage​ ​of​ ​a 
network​ ​of​ ​elite​ ​contacts​ ​to​ ​facilitate​ ​his​ ​entry​ ​into​ ​politics,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​which​ ​were​ ​rewarded​ ​with 
positions​ ​in​ ​the​ ​government​ ​following​ ​his​ ​inauguration.​ ​Despite​ ​however​ ​aiming​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​his 
predecessor’s​ ​policies​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​austerity,​ ​Zelaya​ ​took​ ​notice​ ​of​ ​growing​ ​social​ ​pressures 
created​ ​by​ ​hopelessness​ ​and​ ​suspicion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government.​ ​To​ ​lighten​ ​the​ ​negative​ ​impacts​ ​of 
austerity,​ ​Zelaya​ ​attempted​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​social​ ​life​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​by​ ​appointing​ ​women​ ​to​ ​half​ ​of​ ​his 
cabinets​ ​positions​ ​and​ ​implementing​ ​programs​ ​for​ ​the​ ​poor​ ​and​ ​reforestation​ ​programs. 
Furthermore,​ ​an​ ​ongoing​ ​energy​ ​crisis​ ​which​ ​Zelaya​ ​had​ ​inherited​ ​and​ ​which​ ​had​ ​left​ ​much​ ​of 
the​ ​country​ ​without​ ​power​ ​prompted​ ​the​ ​government​ ​to​ ​bail​ ​out​ ​the​ ​state​ ​owned​ ​energy 
company​ ​Empresa​ ​Nacional​ ​de​ ​Energía​ ​Eléctrica​ ​(ENEE)​ ​in​ ​early​ ​2007. 
In​ ​response​ ​to​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​reforms,​ ​the​ ​favorability​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​grow. 
Increasingly,​ ​Hondurans​ ​felt​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Zelaya​ ​administration​ ​was​ ​legitimately​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​shifting 
the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​the​ ​state​ ​from​ ​being​ ​a​ ​mediator​ ​of​ ​the​ ​elite’s​ ​conflicts​ ​to​ ​addressing​ ​the​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​the 
public.​ ​However,​ ​Zelaya​ ​began​ ​to​ ​generate​ ​criticism​ ​from​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​and​ ​wealthy 
Hondurans​ ​in​ ​2007,​ ​when​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​attended​ ​the​ ​28th​ ​anniversary​ ​ceremony​ ​of​ ​the 
Sandinista​ ​Revolution​ ​in​ ​Nicaragua.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​energy​ ​needs​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the 
lasting​ ​crisis​ ​and​ ​the​ ​bail-out​ ​of​ ​ENEE,​ ​the​ ​administration​ ​announced​ ​that​ ​the​ ​country​ ​would​ ​be 
joining​ ​the​ ​Venezuelan-led​ ​oil​ ​partnership​ ​Petrocaribe.​ ​While​ ​some​ ​were​ ​suspicious​ ​of​ ​Zelaya 
entering​ ​into​ ​such​ ​an​ ​alliance​ ​with​ ​Hugo​ ​Chávez,​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​business​ ​sector​ ​viewed​ ​the 
decision​ ​favorably​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​to​ ​secure​ ​access​ ​to​ ​cheap​ ​oil.​ ​Support​ ​of​ ​the​ ​administration 
however​ ​became​ ​much​ ​more​ ​polarized​ ​in​ ​2008,​ ​when​ ​Zelaya​ ​announced​ ​he​ ​would​ ​take 
integration​ ​one​ ​step​ ​further​ ​and​ ​join​ ​the​ ​Bolivarian​ ​Alliance​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Peoples​ ​of​ ​Our​ ​America 
(Alianza​ ​Bolivariana​ ​para​ ​los​ ​Pueblos​ ​de​ ​Nuestra​ ​América,​ ​ALBA).​ ​ALBA,​ ​created​ ​in​ ​2004​ ​by 
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Cuba​ ​and​ ​Venezuela,​ ​was​ ​comprised​ ​of​ ​other​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​nations​ ​with​ ​leftist​ ​governments 
as​ ​well​ ​and​ ​aimed​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​economic​ ​security​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sphere​ ​of​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​the 
United​ ​States.​ ​It​ ​also​ ​aimed​ ​to​ ​create​ ​a​ ​new​ ​currency​ ​called​ ​the​ ​SUCRE​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​stabilize 
markets​ ​in​ ​those​ ​countries​ ​with​ ​governments​ ​isolated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​a​ ​widely​ ​unpopular 
strategy​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​its​ ​allies. 
At​ ​the​ ​treaty​ ​signing​ ​ceremony​ ​which​ ​established​ ​Honduras’​ ​membership​ ​in​ ​ALBA, 
Zelaya​ ​formally​ ​announced​ ​that​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​aimed​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​implementing​ ​left-of-center 
policies.​ ​At​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​unfavorability​ ​among​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​elite​ ​became​ ​clear​ ​as​ ​his 
network​ ​of​ ​allies​ ​began​ ​to​ ​deteriorate,​ ​stagnating​ ​his​ ​administration’s​ ​political​ ​efforts.​ ​By​ ​the​ ​end 
of​ ​2008,​ ​the​ ​government​ ​could​ ​not​ ​reach​ ​a​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​business​ ​leaders​ ​to​ ​raise​ ​the​ ​minimum 
wage,​ ​and​ ​instead​ ​raised​ ​it​ ​by​ ​60%​ ​through​ ​an​ ​executive​ ​order​ ​which​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court 
upheld.​ ​With​ ​a​ ​revived​ ​sense​ ​that​ ​Honduran​ ​politics​ ​were​ ​simply​ ​not​ ​structured​ ​to​ ​serve​ ​the 
public,​ ​Zelaya​ ​announced​ ​in​ ​May​ ​2009​ ​he​ ​would​ ​organize​ ​a​ ​non-binding​ ​opinion​ ​poll​ ​on​ ​whether 
the​ ​country​ ​should​ ​have​ ​a​ ​referendum​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​if​ ​the​ ​constitution​ ​should​ ​be​ ​rewritten.​ ​Since 
the​ ​country’s​ ​democratic​ ​transition​ ​in​ ​1981,​ ​the​ ​constitution​ ​had​ ​been​ ​amended​ ​several​ ​times, 
however​ ​public​ ​frustration​ ​continued​ ​as​ ​the​ ​status-quo​ ​persisted.​ ​When​ ​Zelaya​ ​ordered​ ​the 
military​ ​to​ ​organize​ ​the​ ​polling​ ​process,​ ​General​ ​Vasquez​ ​Velasquez​ ​refused,​ ​and​ ​he​ ​was 
removed​ ​from​ ​his​ ​position.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​other​ ​military​ ​generals​ ​and​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​Defence 
Minister​ ​resigned,​ ​leading​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​to​ ​order​ ​Zelaya​ ​to​ ​reinstate​ ​Velasquez.​ ​Zelaya, 
citing​ ​the​ ​1998​ ​constitutional​ ​amendment​ ​which​ ​transferred​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​Commander-in-Chief​ ​of 
the​ ​military​ ​to​ ​the​ ​president​ ​and​ ​officially​ ​ended​ ​its​ ​status​ ​as​ ​an​ ​autonomous​ ​institution,​ ​refused 
and​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​organize​ ​plans​ ​for​ ​a​ ​poll​ ​for​ ​June​ ​29th​ ​(Cunha​ ​Filho​ ​et.​ ​al.).​ ​During​ ​the​ ​night​ ​of 
June​ ​28th,​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​military​ ​broke​ ​into​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​home​ ​in​ ​Tegucigalpa​ ​and​ ​evicted​ ​him​ ​at 
gunpoint,​ ​while​ ​his​ ​daughter​ ​hid​ ​under​ ​her​ ​bed​ ​and​ ​his​ ​cleaning​ ​lady​ ​was​ ​dragged​ ​from​ ​the 
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house​ ​by​ ​her​ ​hair,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​a​ ​2011​ ​​Democracy​ ​Now!​​ ​interview​ ​with​ ​Zelaya.​ ​The​ ​next​ ​day, 
the​ ​Speaker​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Congress​ ​and​ ​member​ ​of​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​own​ ​PLH,​ ​Roberto​ ​Micheletti,​ ​was 
inaugurated​ ​as​ ​interim​ ​president​ ​to​ ​serve​ ​out​ ​the​ ​remaining​ ​two​ ​months​ ​of​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​term.  
3.4-​ ​The​ ​United​ ​States​ ​Responds 
In​ ​an​ ​interview​ ​with​ ​former​ ​president​ ​Zelaya​ ​conducted​ ​in​ ​2011​ ​by​ ​Amy​ ​Goodman​ ​of 
Democracy​ ​Now!,​ ​​he​ ​claims​ ​the​ ​CIA​ ​was​ ​behind​ ​a​ ​false​ ​information​ ​campaign​ ​to​ ​convince 
business​ ​leaders​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​that​ ​communism​ ​was​ ​returning​ ​to​ ​Latin​ ​America.​ ​Through​ ​the 
leadership​ ​of​ ​Venezuela,​ ​governments​ ​of​ ​weaker​ ​countries​ ​would​ ​work​ ​to​ ​dismantle​ ​US 
leadership​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​attack​ ​the​ ​security​ ​of​ ​the​ ​western​ ​hemisphere.​ ​Zelaya​ ​states​ ​that​ ​this 
message​ ​was​ ​immediately​ ​adopted​ ​and​ ​spread​ ​around​ ​Honduras’​ ​private​ ​sector,​ ​which​ ​relies 
on​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​for​ ​trade,​ ​like​ ​wildfire.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​business,​ ​government,​ ​and​ ​military 
elites​ ​orchestrated​ ​his​ ​kidnapping​ ​and​ ​removal.​ ​While​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​explicit​ ​evidence​ ​to​ ​support 
this​ ​claim,​ ​several​ ​events​ ​leading​ ​up​ ​to​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​ouster​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​reactions​ ​of​ ​top​ ​US 
government​ ​officials​ ​after​ ​June​ ​29th​ ​indicate​ ​that​ ​the​ ​results​ ​of​ ​the​ ​illegal​ ​coup​ ​carried​ ​out 
against​ ​president​ ​Zelaya​ ​were​ ​aligned​ ​with​ ​the​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​government​ ​at​ ​the 
time. 
In​ ​a​ ​document​ ​released​ ​by​ ​Wikileaks,​ ​the​ ​knowledge​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​State​ ​Department 
under​ ​Hillary​ ​Clinton​ ​had​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​is​ ​exposed.​ ​The​ ​report,​ ​titled​ ​“Open​ ​and​ ​Shut:​ ​The 
Case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​Coup”​ ​was​ ​sent​ ​from​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States’​ ​embassy​ ​in​ ​Tegucigalpa​ ​a​ ​month 
after​ ​Zelaya​ ​was​ ​removed​ ​from​ ​his​ ​position.​ ​In​ ​it,​ ​US​ ​ambassador​ ​Hugo​ ​Llorens​ ​clearly​ ​states 
that​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​conduct​ ​a​ ​non-binding​ ​opinion​ ​poll​ ​did​ ​not​ ​violate​ ​any​ ​Honduran​ ​laws. 
Furthermore,​ ​he​ ​states​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​National​ ​Congress​ ​and​ ​the​ ​military,​ ​the​ ​primary 
organizations​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​the​ ​coup,​ ​had​ ​no​ ​authority​ ​over​ ​the​ ​presidency,​ ​as​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​the 
Honduran​ ​constitution.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​removal​ ​of​ ​a​ ​president,​ ​Llorens​ ​states,​ ​a​ ​structured 
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process​ ​of​ ​impeachment​ ​must​ ​be​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​by​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​Supreme​ ​Court.​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​this 
already​ ​established​ ​legal​ ​framework​ ​was​ ​completely​ ​undermined.​ ​Regarding​ ​the​ ​interim 
presidency​ ​of​ ​Roberto​ ​Micheletti,​ ​Llorens​ ​states​ ​that​ ​power​ ​is​ ​only​ ​transferred​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Speaker​ ​of 
the​ ​Congress​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​president’s​ ​death,​ ​resignation,​ ​or​ ​formal​ ​criminal​ ​conviction. 
Finally,​ ​under​ ​a​ ​section​ ​titled​ ​“Forced​ ​Removal​ ​by​ ​Military​ ​was​ ​Clearly​ ​Illegal”​ ​the​ ​report​ ​cites 
the​ ​Honduran​ ​constitution​ ​which​ ​states​ ​that​ ​no​ ​Honduran​ ​citizen​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​forced​ ​from​ ​the 
country,​ ​definitively​ ​proving​ ​that​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​forced​ ​exile​ ​was​ ​unconstitutional.  
Initially,​ ​the​ ​international​ ​community​ ​reacted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​as​ ​expected:​ ​the 
OAS​ ​voted​ ​to​ ​suspend​ ​Honduras’​ ​membership,​ ​the​ ​UN​ ​General​ ​Assembly​ ​called​ ​for​ ​Zelaya’s 
immediate​ ​restoration​ ​to​ ​power,​ ​and​ ​even​ ​President​ ​Barack​ ​Obama​ ​announced​ ​the​ ​day​ ​after 
the​ ​coup​ ​that​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​believed​ ​“the​ ​coup​ ​was​ ​not​ ​legal​ ​and​ ​that​ ​[democratically 
elected]​ ​President​ ​Zelaya​ ​remains​ ​the​ ​president​ ​of​ ​Honduras”​ ​(Goodman​ ​and​ ​Moynihan, 
256-257).​ ​In​ ​the​ ​following​ ​months,​ ​however,​ ​such​ ​harsh​ ​condemnations​ ​seemed​ ​to​ ​relax,​ ​and 
the​ ​situation​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​adopted​ ​an​ ​all​ ​too​ ​familiar​ ​aura​ ​of​ ​despondency.​ ​In​ ​September,​ ​the 
OAS​ ​signed​ ​the​ ​San​ ​José​ ​agreement,​ ​which​ ​would​ ​reinstate​ ​Zelaya​ ​however​ ​would​ ​reorganize 
his​ ​cabinet​ ​to​ ​include​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​regime.​ ​Zelaya​ ​accepted​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​agreement 
reluctantly,​ ​however​ ​Micheletti​ ​refused​ ​them​ ​outright.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​despite​ ​having​ ​initially 
referred​ ​to​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​ouster​ ​as​ ​a​ ​coup,​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration​ ​suspiciously​ ​stopped 
employing​ ​such​ ​condemning​ ​language.​ ​While​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​official​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​this,​ ​many 
critics​ ​point​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​recognizing​ ​an​ ​illegal​ ​coup​ ​would​ ​declare​ ​all​ ​economic​ ​aid​ ​to​ ​a 
country​ ​illegal.​ ​As​ ​aid​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​flow​ ​from​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​many​ ​have​ ​asserted​ ​that​ ​this 
strategic​ ​move​ ​was​ ​made​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​support​ ​Honduras’​ ​new​ ​government​ ​through 
legitimate​ ​channels,​ ​as​ ​Micheletti​ ​and​ ​the​ ​traditional​ ​power​ ​structures​ ​which​ ​had​ ​existed​ ​in 
Honduras​ ​for​ ​centuries​ ​were​ ​far​ ​more​ ​amiable​ ​to​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​than​ ​Zelaya​ ​had​ ​been​ ​(257).  
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In​ ​Hillary​ ​Clinton’s​ ​2014​ ​book​ ​“Hard​ ​Choices”​ ​she​ ​documents​ ​her​ ​time​ ​as​ ​Secretary​ ​of 
State​ ​under​ ​President​ ​Obama.​ ​A​ ​section​ ​from​ ​her​ ​chapter​ ​on​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​states​ ​that​ ​he​ ​was 
removed​ ​from​ ​office​ ​due​ ​to​ ​fears​ ​that​ ​he​ ​would​ ​“circumvent​ ​the​ ​constitution​ ​and​ ​extend​ ​his​ ​term 
in​ ​office”,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​after​ ​she​ ​had​ ​met​ ​with​ ​regional​ ​leaders,​ ​​they​ ​“strategized​ ​on​ ​a​ ​plan​ ​to​ ​restore 
order​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​and​ ​ensure​ ​that​ ​free​ ​and​ ​fair​ ​elections​ ​could​ ​be​ ​held​ ​quickly​ ​and​ ​legitimately, 
which​ ​would​ ​render​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​Zelaya​ ​moot.”​ ​While​ ​these​ ​after-the-fact​ ​testaments​ ​do​ ​not 
appear​ ​to​ ​be​ ​indicative​ ​of​ ​shady​ ​dealings,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​note​ ​that​ ​Clinton’s​ ​state​ ​department 
was​ ​aware​ ​that​ ​Zelaya​ ​was​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​not​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​extend​ ​his​ ​term​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​leaked 
report​ ​“Open​ ​and​ ​Shut:​ ​The​ ​Case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​Coup”.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​while​ ​Clinton​ ​was,​ ​in 
her​ ​own​ ​words,​ ​strategizing​ ​a​ ​plan​ ​to​ ​“render​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​Zelaya​ ​moot”,​ ​her​ ​public 
condemnation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​immediately​ ​after​ ​it​ ​took​ ​place​ ​reveals​ ​that​ ​the​ ​State​ ​Department’s 
dealings​ ​were​ ​not​ ​being​ ​honestly​ ​reported.​ ​Several​ ​critics​ ​have​ ​also​ ​raised​ ​questions​ ​about 
Clinton’s​ ​friendship​ ​with​ ​Lanny​ ​Davis,​ ​a​ ​high-profile​ ​attorney​ ​who​ ​worked​ ​as​ ​a​ ​lobbyist​ ​for​ ​the 
Honduran​ ​government​ ​in​ ​Washington​ ​after​ ​“free​ ​and​ ​fair​ ​elections”​ ​had​ ​led​ ​to​ ​PNH​ ​candidate 
and​ ​former​ ​Zelaya​ ​opponent​ ​Porfirio​ ​“Lobo”​ ​Soza’s​ ​presidency​ ​(Goodman​ ​and​ ​Moynihan,​ ​269).  
Critics​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US​ ​response​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2009​ ​coup​ ​d’etat​ ​have​ ​identified​ ​several​ ​issues​ ​which 
the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​government​ ​and​ ​the​ ​CIA​ ​may​ ​have​ ​had​ ​with​ ​Zelaya.​ ​First​ ​and​ ​most​ ​obviously, 
the​ ​Zelaya​ ​administration’s​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​join​ ​ALBA​ ​raised​ ​eyebrows​ ​in​ ​the​ ​north​ ​as​ ​it​ ​seemingly 
added​ ​to​ ​Venezuela’s​ ​growing​ ​regional​ ​power.​ ​Specifically,​ ​ALBA’s​ ​goal​ ​to​ ​create​ ​a​ ​currency​ ​to 
replace​ ​the​ ​US​ ​dollar​ ​as​ ​the​ ​universal​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​transactions​ ​between​ ​member​ ​nations​ ​would 
lower​ ​the​ ​dollar’s​ ​demand​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​its​ ​depreciation,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​has​ ​been​ ​a​ ​floating​ ​currency 
since​ ​the​ ​1971​ ​abandonment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​gold​ ​standard.​ ​Zelaya​ ​also​ ​had​ ​plans​ ​to​ ​vacate​ ​a​ ​US 
military​ ​base​ ​that​ ​had​ ​been​ ​established​ ​in​ ​1981​ ​to​ ​train​ ​Contras,​ ​instead​ ​using​ ​it​ ​as​ ​a​ ​civilian 
airport​ ​as​ ​the​ ​infrastructure​ ​in​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​main​ ​airport​ ​was​ ​dangerously​ ​crumbling​ ​and​ ​the 
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country​ ​lacked​ ​the​ ​funds​ ​to​ ​fix​ ​it.​ ​Ironically,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​2011​ ​​Democracy​ ​Now! 
interview,​ ​his​ ​plane​ ​was​ ​taken​ ​to​ ​that​ ​same​ ​military​ ​base​ ​to​ ​refuel​ ​on​ ​his​ ​way​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country, 
suggesting​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Honduran​ ​military​ ​had​ ​permission​ ​to​ ​use​ ​the​ ​base​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​indicating​ ​that 
the​ ​US​ ​military​ ​was​ ​aware​ ​of​ ​the​ ​plans​ ​of​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​before​ ​they​ ​were​ ​carried​ ​out. 
 
 
3.5-​ ​Recent​ ​Developments  
Immediately​ ​following​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​ouster​ ​from​ ​the​ ​presidency,​ ​Honduras​ ​erupted​ ​in​ ​protests 
that​ ​were​ ​often​ ​violently​ ​suppressed.​ ​Political​ ​repression​ ​became​ ​widespread,​ ​and 
dissatisfaction​ ​with​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​government​ ​led​ ​to​ ​the​ ​formation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​broad​ ​leftist​ ​movement 
which​ ​created​ ​the​ ​political​ ​party​ ​Libertad​ ​y​ ​Refundación​ ​(Liberty​ ​and​ ​Refoundation-​ ​Libre).​ ​In​ ​the 
following​ ​years,​ ​political​ ​violence​ ​has​ ​increased,​ ​as​ ​have​ ​drug​ ​related​ ​crimes.​ ​Particularly 
marginalized​ ​groups​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​Garifuna​ ​population​ ​(Afro-​ ​Hondurans),​ ​the​ ​Lenca​ ​indigenous 
population,​ ​and​ ​women​ ​have​ ​been​ ​the​ ​targets​ ​of​ ​torture,​ ​forced​ ​disappearance,​ ​and​ ​murder.​ ​All 
the​ ​while,​ ​the​ ​government​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​economic​ ​policies​ ​which​ ​primarily​ ​benefit​ ​the 
country’s​ ​elite​ ​and​ ​are​ ​almost​ ​universally​ ​opposed​ ​by​ ​marginalized​ ​groups.  
When​ ​President​ ​Zelaya​ ​was​ ​removed​ ​from​ ​his​ ​home​ ​in​ ​June​ ​of​ ​2009,​ ​the​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​his 
term​ ​had​ ​already​ ​been​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​and​ ​presidential​ ​elections​ ​were​ ​scheduled​ ​for​ ​later​ ​in​ ​the 
year.​ ​An​ ​attempt​ ​by​ ​Zelaya​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country​ ​a​ ​week​ ​after​ ​his​ ​removal​ ​was​ ​blocked​ ​when 
military​ ​vehicles​ ​drove​ ​onto​ ​Tegucigalpa’s​ ​airport’s​ ​runway,​ ​and​ ​supporters​ ​who​ ​had​ ​gathered​ ​to 
welcome​ ​the​ ​president​ ​were​ ​dispersed​ ​with​ ​live​ ​fire​ ​which​ ​killed​ ​a​ ​19​ ​year​ ​old​ ​boy​ ​(Goodman 
and​ ​Moynihan,​ ​268).​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​when​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​reinstating​ ​Zelaya​ ​for​ ​the​ ​remaining 
two​ ​months​ ​of​ ​his​ ​term​ ​arose,​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​National​ ​Congress​ ​refused​ ​to​ ​debate​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​until 
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after​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​former​ ​conservative​ ​opponent,​ ​popularly​ ​known​ ​as​ ​“Lobo”​ ​(wolf)​ ​Soza,​ ​had 
secured​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​in​ ​a​ ​widely​ ​boycotted​ ​election.​ ​The​ ​debate​ ​was​ ​finally​ ​resumed,​ ​and​ ​the 
congress​ ​voted​ ​overwhelmingly​ ​to​ ​deny​ ​Zelaya​ ​the​ ​remainder​ ​of​ ​his​ ​term​ ​(Britannica.com).​ ​In 
response,​ ​pro-​ ​Zelaya​ ​demonstrations​ ​took​ ​place​ ​across​ ​the​ ​country,​ ​and​ ​OAS-IACHR 
observers​ ​found​ ​that​ ​protesters​ ​were​ ​violently​ ​suppressed​ ​by​ ​security​ ​forces​ ​and​ ​that​ ​thousands 
were​ ​arbitrarily​ ​detained.​ ​Later​ ​in​ ​the​ ​year,​ ​Zelaya​ ​managed​ ​to​ ​re-enter​ ​Honduras​ ​secretly,​ ​and 
was​ ​granted​ ​asylum​ ​at​ ​the​ ​Brazilian​ ​embassy​ ​in​ ​Tegucigalpa.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​show​ ​of​ ​solidarity,​ ​his 
supporters​ ​camped​ ​outside​ ​the​ ​embassy,​ ​which​ ​was​ ​inundated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Anthem​ ​of 
Honduras​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​Honduran​ ​insult-songs​ ​from​ ​speakers​ ​mounted​ ​on​ ​military​ ​vehicles. 
Furthermore,​ ​the​ ​government​ ​imposed​ ​a​ ​curfew​ ​after​ ​Zelaya’s​ ​return,​ ​and​ ​when​ ​his​ ​supporters 
refused​ ​to​ ​comply​ ​they​ ​were​ ​dispersed​ ​with​ ​water​ ​cannons​ ​and​ ​tear​ ​gas.​ ​The​ ​Honduran 
government​ ​also​ ​shut​ ​off​ ​the​ ​Brazilian​ ​embassy’s​ ​water,​ ​electricity,​ ​and​ ​telephone​ ​service,​ ​and 
Zelaya​ ​agreed​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​exile​ ​in​ ​2010​ ​in​ ​a​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​Soza​ ​under​ ​the​ ​condition​ ​that​ ​harassing 
investigations​ ​into​ ​his​ ​presidency​ ​be​ ​dropped​ ​(Goodman​ ​and​ ​Moynihan,​ ​256).  
Violence​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​surrounding​ ​Zelaya-related​ ​issues​ ​became​ ​rampant​ ​under 
Micheletti​ ​and​ ​Lobo,​ ​however​ ​the​ ​trend​ ​quickly​ ​spread​ ​to​ ​any​ ​opponents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government​ ​and 
the​ ​private​ ​sector,​ ​eventually​ ​characterizing​ ​the​ ​country​ ​as​ ​a​ ​whole.​ ​According​ ​to​ ​Human​ ​Rights 
Watch​ ​World​ ​Report​ ​of​ ​2014,​ ​Honduras​ ​reached​ ​the​ ​world’s​ ​highest​ ​murder​ ​rate​ ​in​ ​2013,​ ​a 
statistic​ ​which​ ​has​ ​clung​ ​to​ ​the​ ​country​ ​every​ ​year​ ​since.​ ​Police​ ​brutality​ ​has​ ​come​ ​to​ ​be 
expected,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​2011​ ​and​ ​2012,​ ​there​ ​were​ ​149​ ​reported​ ​killings​ ​of​ ​civilians​ ​by​ ​security​ ​forces. 
These​ ​statistics​ ​come​ ​after​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Congress​ ​passed​ ​a​ ​law​ ​in​ ​2011​ ​allowing​ ​the​ ​military​ ​to 
act​ ​as​ ​a​ ​public​ ​security​ ​force,​ ​which​ ​was​ ​replaced​ ​by​ ​a​ ​2013​ ​law​ ​which​ ​called​ ​for​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​of 
a​ ​new​ ​military-police​ ​force​ ​tasked​ ​with​ ​seizing​ ​violent​ ​neighborhoods.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​same​ ​vein,​ ​between 
Lobo’s​ ​inauguration​ ​in​ ​2010​ ​and​ ​2013,​ ​29​ ​journalists​ ​were​ ​murdered,​ ​as​ ​compared​ ​with​ ​only 
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seven​ ​between​ ​2003​ ​and​ ​2009.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​rural​ ​violence​ ​has​ ​been​ ​rampant​ ​since​ ​Zelaya’s 
land​ ​reforms​ ​redistributed​ ​land​ ​to​ ​peasant​ ​families.​ ​Soza​ ​and​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​largely​ ​failed​ ​to 
enforce​ ​these​ ​reforms,​ ​resulting​ ​in​ ​the​ ​killings​ ​of​ ​farmers​ ​by​ ​mercenaries​ ​and​ ​private​ ​security 
firms​ ​hired​ ​by​ ​wealthy​ ​landowners​ ​and​ ​corporations.​ ​Leading​ ​up​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2013​ ​elections,​ ​political 
violence​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​increase,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​report​ ​by​ ​Rights​ ​Action​ ​found​ ​a​ ​disproportionately​ ​number 
of​ ​killings​ ​to​ ​be​ ​of​ ​Libre​ ​candidates.​ ​While​ ​candidates​ ​are​ ​often​ ​targeted​ ​leading​ ​up​ ​to 
presidential​ ​elections,​ ​the​ ​motivation​ ​behind​ ​these​ ​killings​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​when​ ​analyzing​ ​the​ ​victims: 
Erick​ ​Martinez,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​was​ ​an​ ​LGBTI​ ​activist,​ ​and​ ​Joni​ ​Rivas,​ ​a​ ​leader​ ​in​ ​the​ ​United 
Campesino​ ​Movement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Aguan.​ ​Ultimately,​ ​conservative​ ​candidate​ ​Juan​ ​Orlando 
Hernandez​ ​was​ ​successful​ ​in​ ​his​ ​bid​ ​for​ ​the​ ​presidency,​ ​however​ ​the​ ​Libre​ ​candidate​ ​and 
Zelaya’s​ ​wife​ ​Xiomara​ ​Castro​ ​came​ ​in​ ​second,​ ​marking​ ​the​ ​first​ ​time​ ​in​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​history​ ​that 
the​ ​two​ ​party​ ​system​ ​had​ ​been​ ​disrupted.  
Honduras,​ ​during​ ​the​ ​past​ ​four​ ​years​ ​under​ ​Hernandez,​ ​has​ ​essentially​ ​experienced​ ​a 
continuation​ ​of​ ​Soza’s​ ​presidency.​ ​The​ ​murder​ ​rate​ ​has​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​skyrocket​ ​every​ ​year,​ ​with 
activists​ ​and​ ​journalists​ ​fearing​ ​for​ ​their​ ​lives.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​aftermath​ ​of​ ​Libre’s​ ​unprecedented 
success,​ ​however,​ ​popular​ ​struggles​ ​against​ ​corruption​ ​and​ ​violence​ ​have​ ​been​ ​re-energized. 
Two​ ​events​ ​in​ ​particular​ ​have​ ​polarized​ ​Hondurans:​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​supreme​ ​court, 
packed​ ​with​ ​conservatives​ ​during​ ​Soza’s​ ​and​ ​Hernandez’​ ​administrations,​ ​voted​ ​that​ ​the 
country’s​ ​constitution​ ​could​ ​not​ ​prohibit​ ​a​ ​sitting​ ​president​ ​from​ ​seeking​ ​reelection.​ ​In​ ​2016, 
Berta​ ​Caceres,​ ​an​ ​internationally​ ​renowned​ ​activist​ ​for​ ​women’s,​ ​indigenous,​ ​and​ ​environmental 
rights​ ​was​ ​murdered​ ​after​ ​protesting​ ​a​ ​hydroelectric​ ​dam​ ​project,​ ​and​ ​ongoing​ ​investigations 
have​ ​linked​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​military​ ​to​ ​her​ ​assassins.​ ​Since​ ​her​ ​assassination,​ ​an​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​put 
a​ ​bill​ ​called​ ​the​ ​Berta​ ​Caceres​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​in​ ​Honduras​ ​Act​ ​(H.R.​ ​5474)​ ​through​ ​the​ ​US 
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Congress,​ ​which​ ​would​ ​deny​ ​aid​ ​to​ ​Honduras​ ​until​ ​human​ ​rights​ ​violations​ ​have​ ​ceased,​ ​has 
seen​ ​little​ ​support.  
When​ ​Hernandez​ ​made​ ​his​ ​candidacy​ ​for​ ​the​ ​2017​ ​presidential​ ​election​ ​known,​ ​a 
coalition​ ​was​ ​formed​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​country’s​ ​major​ ​left-leaning​ ​parties,​ ​and​ ​aptly​ ​named​ ​itself​ ​the 
Opposition​ ​Alliance​ ​Against​ ​Dictatorship.​ ​The​ ​alliance​ ​was​ ​led​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Libre​ ​party​ ​under​ ​the 
coordination​ ​of​ ​former​ ​President​ ​Zelaya,​ ​however​ ​chose​ ​its​ ​candidate​ ​to​ ​be​ ​Salvador​ ​Nasralla,​ ​a 
former​ ​television​ ​personality​ ​and​ ​leader​ ​of​ ​the​ ​centrist​ ​Anti-Corruption​ ​party.​ ​On​ ​November​ ​26th, 
after​ ​a​ ​brief​ ​interruption​ ​in​ ​the​ ​vote​ ​count​ ​that​ ​had​ ​Nasralla​ ​ahead​ ​with​ ​most​ ​of​ ​the​ ​votes 
counted,​ ​Hernandez​ ​was​ ​announced​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​winner​ ​of​ ​the​ ​race​ ​despite​ ​polls​ ​leading​ ​up​ ​to​ ​the 
election​ ​clearly​ ​indicating​ ​Nasralla’s​ ​dominating​ ​lead.​ ​Protests​ ​again​ ​erupted​ ​across​ ​the​ ​country, 
and​ ​even​ ​the​ ​center-right​ ​candidate​ ​of​ ​the​ ​traditional​ ​PLH​ ​Luis​ ​Zelaya​ ​put​ ​his​ ​support​ ​behind 
Nasralla.​ ​Many​ ​have​ ​lost​ ​their​ ​lives​ ​in​ ​protests​ ​in​ ​the​ ​days​ ​since​ ​the​ ​election,​ ​and​ ​when​ ​the 
government​ ​called​ ​on​ ​the​ ​police​ ​force​ ​to​ ​enforce​ ​a​ ​specially​ ​imposed​ ​curfew,​ ​something​ ​historic 
happened:​ ​for​ ​the​ ​first​ ​time​ ​in​ ​its​ ​history,​ ​the​ ​police​ ​force​ ​disobeyed,​ ​stating​ ​it​ ​would​ ​not​ ​carry 
out​ ​attacks​ ​against​ ​its​ ​own​ ​people.​ ​Currently,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​still​ ​much​ ​in​ ​dispute​ ​around​ ​the​ ​November 
26th​ ​election,​ ​however​ ​opposition​ ​supporters​ ​have​ ​once​ ​again​ ​adopted​ ​a​ ​bleak​ ​outlook.  
While​ ​it​ ​echoes​ ​former​ ​episodes​ ​in​ ​Honduras,​ ​​ ​the​ ​irony​ ​of​ ​the​ ​current​ ​situation​ ​is​ ​too 
great​ ​to​ ​be​ ​overlooked:​ ​Zelaya,​ ​who​ ​was​ ​removed​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coup​ ​d’etat​ ​for​ ​suspicions​ ​of​ ​seeking​ ​to 
extend​ ​his​ ​term​ ​has​ ​organized​ ​a​ ​broad​ ​alliance,​ ​ranging​ ​from​ ​the​ ​center​ ​to​ ​the​ ​far-left​ ​of​ ​the 
political​ ​spectrum.​ ​Hernandez,​ ​who​ ​supported​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​against​ ​Zelaya,​ ​has​ ​won​ ​his 
unconstitutional​ ​bid​ ​for​ ​the​ ​presidency,​ ​becoming​ ​the​ ​first​ ​president​ ​to​ ​be​ ​re-elected​ ​since​ ​the 






Across​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​very​ ​few​ ​Americans​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​deny​ ​the​ ​unequal​ ​and​ ​exploitative 
relationships​ ​of​ ​the​ ​late​ ​19th​ ​and​ ​early​ ​20th​ ​centuries​ ​between​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​and​ ​its 
neighbors​ ​to​ ​the​ ​south.​ ​Fewer,​ ​however,​ ​can​ ​recognize​ ​the​ ​link​ ​that​ ​exists​ ​between​ ​these​ ​former 
relationships​ ​and​ ​the​ ​hardships​ ​faced​ ​by​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​today.​ ​While​ ​policies​ ​towards​ ​Latin 
America​ ​have​ ​been​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​the​ ​establishment​ ​of​ ​international​ ​norms,​ ​this​ ​is​ ​not​ ​to​ ​say 
that​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​resembles​ ​a​ ​colonial​ ​empire.​ ​A​ ​more​ ​accurate​ ​term​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​the 
behavior​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​government​ ​would​ ​be​ ​opportunistic,​ ​as​ ​initial​ ​developments 
carried​ ​out​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fledgling​ ​nation​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​were​ ​necessary​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​ensure 
regional​ ​stability​ ​in​ ​the​ ​face​ ​of​ ​colonial​ ​dominance.​ ​Such​ ​developments​ ​resulted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​economic 
well​ ​being​ ​of​ ​the​ ​American​ ​private​ ​sector,​ ​incentivizing​ ​its​ ​expansion​ ​both​ ​horizontally​ ​in​ ​terms 
of​ ​reaching​ ​other​ ​nations​ ​and​ ​vertically​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​deepening​ ​economic​ ​integration.​ ​While​ ​the 
American​ ​economy​ ​flourished,​ ​however,​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​leaders​ ​became​ ​caught​ ​in​ ​a​ ​cycle​ ​of 
paying​ ​off​ ​debts​ ​while​ ​their​ ​constituents​ ​dealt​ ​with​ ​social​ ​issues​ ​resulting​ ​from​ ​foreign​ ​influence 
over​ ​the​ ​private​ ​and​ ​public​ ​sectors​ ​of​ ​these​ ​nations.​ ​Through​ ​embezzlement,​ ​many​ ​leaders 
have​ ​been​ ​able​ ​to​ ​retain​ ​power​ ​throughout​ ​Latin​ ​America,​ ​while​ ​providing​ ​a​ ​stable​ ​and​ ​thus 
attractive​ ​economic​ ​regime​ ​for​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States.​ ​For​ ​social​ ​movements​ ​which​ ​emphasize 
equality​ ​and​ ​freedom,​ ​values​ ​which​ ​are​ ​typically​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​American​ ​identity,​ ​this​ ​presents 
a​ ​paradox​ ​as​ ​their​ ​failures​ ​have​ ​often​ ​been​ ​exacerbated​ ​by​ ​American​ ​taxpayer​ ​or​ ​corporate 
money.​ ​In​ ​Central​ ​America,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​problems​ ​which​ ​existed​ ​150​ ​years​ ​ago​ ​persist 
today,​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​the​ ​power​ ​structures​ ​which​ ​maintain​ ​social​ ​inequalities. 
Most​ ​recently,​ ​it​ ​has​ ​appeared​ ​that​ ​Central​ ​American​ ​social​ ​movements​ ​are​ ​gaining​ ​traction​ ​in 
the​ ​direction​ ​of​ ​true​ ​social​ ​reorganization,​ ​however​ ​these​ ​movements​ ​will​ ​be​ ​contingent​ ​on​ ​the 
concentrated​ ​deconstruction​ ​of​ ​international​ ​norms​ ​and​ ​precedents.​ ​While​ ​not​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​the 
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generosity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​progress​ ​in​ ​Central​ ​America​ ​will​ ​certainly​ ​be​ ​slow​ ​if​ ​recent 
trends​ ​in​ ​the​ ​American​ ​political​ ​culture​ ​continue,​ ​as​ ​evidenced​ ​by​ ​the​ ​adoption​ ​“America​ ​First” 
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